Defence: Deutschland unter alles?

By Richard North - March 17, 2023

Accustomed as we are to critical reports about the status of the British military, it would be easy to enjoy a certain amount of schadenfreude at the report of Eva Högl, parliamentary commissioner for the German armed forces, delivered on 14 March in Berlin covering the year 2022.

To give a flavour of its contents, the press conference has been reported in The Times under the headline “German army’s shoddy kit, tank shortages and poor morale revealed”.

It is also reported elsewhere in the British media, including the Financial Times, which has the less flamboyant headline of “German military upgrade would take ‘half a century’ to complete”, with the sub-heading: “Annual report slams ‘sluggish’ overhaul of Bundeswehr despite last year’s extra funding pledge”.

Additionally, the BBC attempts to cover the report, adopting a line similar to that taken by the FT, its headline stating: “German military boost fails to spend single euro”, with a somewhat misleading opening which initially describes Högl as a “senior German MP”.

Before getting down to brass tacks about the substance of the report (which has not yet been posted on the Bundestag website), it is important to note the unique position of the parliamentary commissioner of the armed forces who is appointed by the German parliament and is solely responsible to the parliament, and is thus entirely independent of the executive.

In the UK, there is no direct equivalent, and while the Defence select committee exercises some sort of parliamentary oversight, its inquiries (in my view) are fragmented, often weak and lack a general overview of the state of the armed forces.

Crucially – unlike the German system – individual members of the armed forces lack a guaranteed right of access, which they have to Högl, by way of a petition without having to go through official channels. Thus, in the UK system, a report of the nature, extent and candour of type produced annually for the Bundestag simply has no direct equivalent.

That there is an independent channel of access has, in the past, proved to be of some importance. As the German tabloid Bild points out, previous defence ministers have been reluctant to release material on military readiness. The SPD’s Christine Lambrecht even wanted to withhold reports produced by the inspector general of the Bundeswehr from parliament. Before that, the dearly beloved CDU politician, Ursula von der Leyen, had reports classified as secret. MPs had to go to the secret protection agency of the Bundestag in order to read them.

All this changed on 17 January this year with the appointment of the present incumbent, Boris Pistorius, who has been prepared to identify the shortcomings of the military, warning on the anniversary of Putin’s 2022 attack on Ukraine that the armed forces lacked the capability to defend Germany against a Russian attack.

The elevation of Pistorius to defence minister followed the sudden resignation of the gaff-prone Christine Lambrecht, who departed abruptly after the publication by Spiegel of an analysis of the Bundeswehr, headed: “An Examination of the Truly Dire State of Germany’s Military”.

Although the rot started with the fall of the Soviet empire, and the determination to glean a financial “peace dividend” from the collapse of the Soviet armed forces, the deterioration has reached the state where the German military is no longer a functional entity.

As Spiegel puts it, the armed forces have lost their core competence over the years as they have become completely bureaucratised. Within the administration, combat isn’t even a relevant category – except, that is, when it comes to dealing with the next closest department.

Under Lambrecht, the magazine said, the defence ministry and the leadership of the Bundeswehr had fallen into a deep lethargy. It cited an anonymous officer saying that, “Like sepsis, the first organs are now at risk of dying”. An official in the defence ministry said his [now former] boss had been running the ministry as if it were in “palliative care”.

To that extent, therefore, Högl’s report adds little to what is already known, except that her main critique is that Olaf Scholz’s promised €100 billion – to be spent on creating a “capable and ultra-modern” force – does not seem to be trickling down into the military coffers.

So far, according to Högl, only €13 billion of this rearmament fund has been allocated and the regular defence budget has not kept pace with inflation. Even at its most basic, it is estimated that the Bundeswehr needs at least another €20 billion worth of ammunition to meet its core Nato commitments, yet only €1.1 billion has been set aside for this purpose in 2023.

As to the bigger picture, Högl argues that it would take a minimum of €300 billion to modernise the Bundeswehr properly and the process would last half a century at the current speed.

Nevertheless, for all his previous candour, Pistorius rejects the idea that the Bundeswehr is in disarray. He acknowledges that there are “deficits” but asserts that “these aren’t due to the military. Rather, they lie in the equipment and in a number of structures”.

Despite that, he has replaced the head of the Bundeswehr, General Eberhard Zorn, with Major General Carsten Breuer, after criticisms of Zorn’s “stunningly poor analysis of Russian capabilities”.

When it comes to equipment procurement, an illustration of how difficult it is to get to grips with these “deficits” is provided by Spiegel which reports that the Bundeswehr wants to buy 20-30, ultra-modern “Skyranger” air defence systems.

Since the Gepard anti-aircraft gun tank was decommissioned in 2012, the army has lacked mobile air defence. And, with the structural reforms of 2011, the army was geared to foreign missions such as in Afghanistan, where an anti-aircraft tank was not needed, with the capacity seeming to be irrelevant to modern forces.

However, as the changing the situation in Ukraine is demonstrating, air defence systems are vitally necessary to deal with enemy UAVs, low-flying jets and helicopters.

But, urgent though the need for new equipment is, procurement contracts can only be signed next year because the maker, Rheinmetall, is still gearing up for series production, but will not be able to provide the first systems until 2026 at the earliest.

Bild, on the other hand, retails complaints that the Panzerhaubitze 2000 155mm self-propelled howitzers sent to Ukraine from army stocks have yet to be replaced and, to date, no orders have been placed. Furthermore, no new spare parts packages have been ordered, forcing the army to decommission howitzers as they become unserviceable, to be cannibalised for spares to keep a few remaining guns operational.

As to the MBT fleet, the 18 Leopard 2s donated to Ukraine, although small in number, expose a serious capacity gap. While the Heer (Army) has on inventory approximately 300 examples of the type, only 30 percent are currently operational, reducing the once mighty German Army to a mere 100 tanks or so. Replacements need to be ordered and, even then, it will be a while before they reach service.

If these problems sound familiar, they undoubtedly are. The UK’s commitment to sending Challenger 2s to Ukraine, alongside its AS-90 self-propelled howitzers, will leave the British Army similarly short of capacity, with no set date – or early expectations – for the arrival of replacements.

Thus, while elements of the British media may luxuriate in publicising the shortcomings of the German military, it is unlikely that British forces are any better prepared.

In all probability – with the notable exception of Poland – if the all the governments of Europe were to display a candour approaching that of Germany, we would find that that there are no western forces which are adequately prepared to deal with the new defence environment.

And while the German government is at least providing €100 billion of new money, all Sunak’s administration is prepared to commit is another £5 billion, over the next two years, with £3 billion of that being used to support the Aukus pact – aimed at countering Chinese military power in the Indo-Pacific region – along with boosting industrial infrastructure and servicing UK submarines.

Only £1.9billion will be used to replace weapons sent to Ukraine and improve the UK’s munitions infrastructure – a drop in the ocean compared with the actual need to enhance the striking power of the Army.

With a senior US general dismissing the British Army as “no longer regarded as a top-level fighting force”, unable to field even a complete armoured brigade, we are in no position to point the finger at Germany – or any other European nation.