Foreign policy: re-thinking Ukraine

By Richard North - April 12, 2021

The art of prediction in war, as in peace, is fraught with difficulty, but attempts to divine the immediate future nevertheless proceed apace, especially in the troubled border region of Ukraine where the Russian military build-up continues.

Whether or not this inevitably means war is hotly disputed, as is the question of which party – the Ukraine government or the Kremlin – is the prime mover in stoking up the tensions.

And in what may or may not be a prelude to another round of blood-letting, both sides are fighting an increasingly intensive propaganda war, both for domestic purposes and to elicit support from – or deter – interested third parties such as the United States.

For the western media, the increased military and political tension has only recently been of interest, the New York Times, for instance, not devoting significant attention until 30 March when it noted a sharp escalation of tensions after an unusually prolonged exchange of fire over the so-called Line of Contact in the Donetsk Region of eastern Ukraine.

At that point, the NYT reported that the Ukrainian parliament had acknowledged that a ceasefire, negotiated the previous July had broken down, claiming a “significant increase in shelling and armed provocations by the armed forces of the Russian Federation” – while referring to the activities of the Russian-backed separatists.

In fact, there have been 29 separate ceasefires since the start of the conflict in March 2014, with the latest effectively having been over at the end of January, while efforts by the OSCE and others to broker a permanent end to the conflict had stalled.

Since the end of January, therefore, there has been a steady escalation of military action, with opposing forces moving back into the positions they occupied in 2018, along a 250-mile line of trenches redolent of the fortifications of the 1914-18 Great War. Especially relevant to understanding the position of the separatists and the Russians is a detailed early analysis in the Russian-language The Voice of Sevastopol (The Voice) which on 15 March set its context for the movement into the region of Russian military assets, by asking “Is the Ukrainian army preparing to attack in Donbass?”

The paper thus points to “confrontational rhetoric” from Kiev and repression of political forces which are calling for the restoration of relations with Russia. Thus the escalating situation is framed as the Russian military moving into position so as to be ready, if needed, to protect the Russian-speaking Donbass separatists from Ukrainian “aggression”.

What seemingly makes the difference from the earlier military actions, when the two sides fought each other to a standstill, are several factors. Firstly, with more and better-trained troops, improved weapons in greater numbers, and more effective support, the Ukrainian General Staff believe they have a decisive advantage over the separatists, despite what they claim is direct Russian reinforcement.

Additionally, the General Staff have been studying the Nagorno-Karabakh war between Azerbaijan, supported by Turkey, over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, protected by Armenia with the support of the Russians. What marked out this conflict, which lasted from 27 September to 10 November 2020, was the extensive use by the Azerbaijanis of drone strikes in combination with the effective use of electronic sensors and long-range artillery.

The use of drones, it was said at the time, offer small countries very cheap access to tactical aviation and precision guided weapons, enabling them to destroy an opponent’s much-costlier equipment such as tanks and air defence systems. In any event, this equipment appears to have given the Azerbaijanis the advantage in bringing the conflict to a rapid conclusion.

Whether this experience has emboldened Kiev remains to be seen, but is certainly a factor to which The Voice draws attention. But, it also suggests that, even with this technology, a necessary condition for success is the non-intervention of the Russians.

Given that an attack across the border with Donbass could incur major troop losses and heavy civilian casualties, it is suggested that the Russians might instead try to cut the Ukraine in two, with counter-attacks from Crimea and Belgorod, with a simultaneous attack on Kiev from Bryansk and, possibly, Belarus.

At the moment, it is conceded that such an open invasion looks unrealistic, it is certainly the case that, over the last six weeks or so, the Russians have deployed significant forces which keep that option open if needed.

On that basis, while conventional wisdom has Putin as the aggressor poised to invade Donbass, there is an alternative view of the situation This has the Russians responding to the threat of renewed violence by positioning sufficient credible forces in the region to act as a deterrent, forcing the parties back to the table to consider the OSCE “roadmap” for peace.

Meanwhile, such minimal reportage as we are seeing in the UK is both lightweight and predictable in tone. We have, for instance, the Mail reporting on the latest military clash – in which a Ukrainian soldier is said to have been killed – while having foreign secretary Dominic Raab urging Russia to “immediately de-escalate” the situation.

From a Russian perspective, that would appear to be a complete misreading of the position on the ground. And if the Russians see themselves as responding to Ukrainian “aggression”, they will not be inclined to respond positively to what will be seen as Raab’s knee-jerk intervention.

Despite this, The Times dismisses Russian concerns as “the Kremlin’s mischief” and argues that Russia is again testing the West. Nor is comprehension assisted by the superficial, knowledge-free approach of the Mail which labels a photograph of what are probably 2S19 MSTA self-propelled guns (or something very similar) as Russia moving “tanks” (pictured).

As I suggested earlier, it is not only the fact of the Russian military movements that are important. It is also the type and quality of the weapons being deployed, alongside the presence of elite units, which makes the action credible.

Clearly, the presence in the region of these powerful, long-rage artillery pieces gives the Russians a highly flexible capability which will help neutralise any advantage the Ukrainian military thinks it might have.

If the pieces are, in fact, the 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV, rumoured to be on their way to the Ukrainian border – with the ability to conduct high-precision fire from a distance of about 70 km – this adds a further dimension to the Russian response.

Currently, the Kremlin is firmly denying this it is “moving towards war”, with Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov stressing that Russia “will not remain indifferent” to the fate of Russian speakers who live in the conflict-torn region, while asserting that, “Russia is making every possible effort to help resolve this conflict”.

Now, with Brexit, the UK is no longer tied to the EU position, which commits unconditional support to Ukraine, there is room for a more nuanced approach to the situation which would stop short of automatically branding the Kremlin as the aggressor – recalling that it was the EU’s interference on Russia’s doorstep which is, at the very least, partly responsible for the current situation.

For those who constantly demand to see a “Brexit bonus”, the opportunity to re-think our foreign policy is surely one. And that would argue for revisiting our previously fixed positions on matters such as Ukraine.