Ukraine: a whiff of peace?

By Richard North - September 9, 2024

It now seems to belong to another world, that period when I was writing of the remarkable transparency of the Ukrainian battlefields, where every move and counter-move seemed to be enacted in plain sight and recorded by a host of mappers and analysts from both camps, giving what appeared to be a clear oversight of the conflict.

Some of that transparency remains, in that it is still possible to visit one’s favoured analysts (usually more than one) to get what appeared to be a reasonably accurate progress report, but with the advent of multiple fronts (particularly that arising from the Kursk incursion) and differing strategic objectives, the situation on the ground tells even less the whole picture than it ever did.

With greater confusion and uncertainty, it was inevitable that the “biff-bam” Boys Own level of media coverage would slacken off and it is certainly the case that battlefield reports from the legacy media are thin on the ground and less then informative, especially when journalists and their editors seem to favour “human interest” pap rather than hard detail (which is doubtless censored anyway).

Newspapers such as the Guardian do their best with war briefings but even these shed little light on the conflict, with the latest report from this source relying on second and third-hand information to compile its analysis.

One of its sources is the famed Institute for the Study of War assessment (not one of my preferred analysts), but it is intriguing to note its view (from 5 September) that: “The wider impacts of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast on the war and any envisioned diplomatic solution to the war are not yet clear, and assessments of these impacts are premature”.

That is probably as good as it gets, although it seems valid to assume that Zelensky is maintaining a stance of using the incursion (and the territory captured) as a bargaining point, with the prospects of peace talks very much in the air.

This much was evident from a meeting last Friday between Zelensky and German chancellor Scholz, when both agreed on the need for a new peace conference that would include Russia.

Scholz, whose authority seems to be draining away by the day, as the pressure from his coalition partners intensifies, spoke on TV afterwards, telling the broadcaster ZDF, “I believe that now is the time to discuss how to arrive at peace from this state of war, indeed at a faster pace”.

It is worth noting, using the 1950s UN “police action” in Korea as a guide, that the tempo and rationale for military operations changes once peace talks become the dominant factor, with operations sometimes justified for “point scoring” reasons, rather than on purely military grounds.

This makes assessments from the situation on the ground all the more difficult and if Zelensky truly is manoeuvring to create a favourable negotiating position, military logic may be thrown out of the window.

That said, Ukraine’s C-in-C, Gen. Oleksandr Syrskyi is claiming a military rationale for the Kursk incursion, telling CNN that the operation has been a [military] success.

“It reduced the threat of an enemy offensive. We prevented them from acting. We moved the fighting to the enemy’s territory so that [the enemy] could feel what we feel every day”, he claims.

There is nothing new here, with Syrskyi outlining his key objectives, namely: an attempt to stop Russia from using Kursk as a launchpad for a new offensive; to divert Moscow’s forces from other areas, to create a security zone and prevent cross-border shelling of civilian objects; to take prisoners of war and to boost the morale of the Ukrainian troops and the nation overall.

In terms of diverting Russian troops, he claims as evidence of his success that,
“Over the last six days the enemy hasn’t advanced a single metre in the Pokrovsk direction”, the strategic town northwest of Donetsk over which much blood has been spilt.

Arguing that this proves “our strategy is working”, Syrskyi boasts: “We’ve taken away their ability to manoeuvre and to deploy their reinforcement forces from other directions … and this weakening has definitely been felt in other areas. We note the amount of artillery shelling as well as the intensity of the offensive have decreased”.

Even at the time – the interview recorded on 5 September – that would have been unconvincing. One feature the Russian campaign in Donbass has been the “stop-start” nature of the attacks, with major assaults being mounted against towns such as Chasiv Yar, only for operations to be wound down and the sector to go quiet, while other towns and villages take the full force of the Russian assault.

And, given that the interview was (now) four days ago, a lot can change on that front in a few days, as indeed it has. The press agency Ukrinform reports currently (as of 8 September) that “as many as 148 combat clashes between Ukraine’s Defence Forces and Russian invaders took place on the battlefield”, with the enemy’s attacks being the fiercest in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove sectors.

Since the beginning of the day (Sunday), as well as the 148 combat clashes, the Russians carried out 60 airstrikes using 79 glide bombs, 473 kamikaze drone strikes and mounted 2,768 attacks on the positions of Ukrainian troops and populated areas using various types of weapons.

Right on cue, the Russian-supporting Hindustan Times reports on “Putin’s huge blow”, with the capture of the settlements of Novogrodovka and Kalinovo, claiming to have killed 600 Ukrainian troops.

Casualty figures, as always – as well as materiel losses – need to be taken with a pinch of salt. Data from neither side are trustworthy and estimates, even from prestigious sources, are unreliable.

Territorial gains (and losses) however, are easier to confirm – not least when one or other side starts releasing videos of attacks on positions they had, until recently held. And, in this instance, Reuters confirms the Russian capture of the town of Novohrodivka (spelt slightly differently) which lies 12 km (7 miles) from Pokrovsk and is an important staging post in the capture of the city.

Not only relying on official Russian sources, Reuters cite Yuri Podolyaka, an influential Ukrainian-born, pro-Russian military blogger, who has published maps showing Russian forces attacking beyond Novohrodivka in at least two places less than 7 km (4 miles) from Pokrovsk.

This actually seems credible as a Voice of America report talks of Ukrainian forces having abandoned Novohrodivka on grounds that it was militarily indefensible.

Other gains are reported elsewhere and it looks as if Russian operations are continuing to plan, unaffected by the Kursk incursion. Syrskyi’s one marker of success seems more like clutching at straws.

It remains my view, though, that we won’t see any strategic resolution until after the rasputitsa, in October or later, if at all. If Zelensky has a plan for victory, which he says he has, he obviously hasn’t run it past the Russians, who may have plans of their own.

In the meantime, the more sinister development is the expansion of the war against civilian targets, apparently triggered by Ukrainian long-rage attacks on targets inside Russia. With the recent Russian attack on the previously safe western city of Lviv, this may be backfiring on Zelensky, who stands accused of playing politics with people’s lives.

This has pushed the Ukrainian president to talk up his putative peace plan, with a claim that he had discussed it with Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni. In response, Meloni is calling on fellow Italians not to “fall into the trap of Russian propaganda” in believing Ukraine’s fate was sealed. She warns that allowing Russia to win the war “will not bring peace, it will bring chaos”.

While the parties are struggling to find a diplomatic solution, my guess is that Putin is still looking for a resolution on the battlefield. It would be unwise to assume that he will not succeed, whatever the CIA might tell the Financial Times.