Ukraine: intellectually challengered

By Richard North - January 12, 2023

Rather as expected, we are continuing to get a rash of gushing eulogies about the potency of the Challenger 2 tanks which the UK may or may not decide to send to Ukraine in the near future.

High up on the list of moronic coverage comes the Telegraph, as always, with Dominic Nichols writing a piece headed: “How Britain’s Challenger II tanks could alter the battlefield in Ukraine”, burbling about “the protection provided by the Chobham and Dorchester armour” which, he says, “will enable the vehicles to survive direct hits from Russian T-72 tanks”.

Actually, it rather depends on where the tank is hit, and at what range. An impact from a shell from the T-72’s 125mm gun on the tracks or running wheels of a Challenger, even at some distance, would disable it. At short range (under 1,000m), it could readily penetrate the side or rear armour. High performance Russian anti-tank missiles could almost certainly disable a Challenger from any angle, within their operational range.

The point about tanks (even heavies like the Challenger 2) is that, on the modern battlefield, they are disposable, short-lived items. There is no such thing as an impenetrable tank – simply one that can survive long enough to do serious damage to the enemy before it is knocked out. The idea of a super-tank dominating the battlefield lies within the realms of fiction, best confined to war comics.

Even if Britain’s Challenger 2 “will be the most capable armoured vehicle gifted to Ukraine”, as little Dominic asserts, there is nevertheless the small problem of ammunition stocks, which I highlighted earlier, and it is extremely unlikely that there is enough ammunition to sustain these tanks in the field for any length of time.

This, though, is only the start of the problems attendant on deploying Challenger 2s to this theatre. The Soviet-designed T-72, which dominates the battlefield at the moment, weighs in at around 42 tonnes, while the Challenger 2 – with full armour kit – weighs a full 72 tonnes.

It is no coincidence that weight restrictions on Ukrainian roads currently stand at 44 tonnes. As even Wikipedia notes, “some of the roads and bridges in former Warsaw Pact countries were designed such that T-72s can travel along in formation, but NATO tanks could not pass at all, or just one-by-one, significantly reducing their mobility”. Bridges will be an issue.

There is also a further problem when it comes to transporting these tanks, as the standard tank transporter on the Ukrainian inventory is the KamAZ-65225, which is only capable of shifting 50 tonnes.

However, the problem may be solved as the Germans have already promised over 100 MAN HX 81 transporters, capable of moving 73 tonnes. Also promised are eight Oshkosh M1070 heavy tank transport tractors with a similar load-hauling capacity.

Where the road network permits, therefore, there will at least be some means of moving the Challengers, although the heavy-lift capability will have to be available in the right place, at the right time, to maintain battlefield mobility in the limited areas where the tanks can be used. This is especially the case as this equipment will also be needed to move Ukraine’s heavy howitzers and, if they are supplied, any Leopard 2s.

This makes it all the more remarkable that Gen Dannatt should be writing in the Mail that sending just 12 Challengers is not enough to have a significant military impact or to rouse our allies into following our lead. A dozen tanks, he says, is barely more than a token gesture.

Dannatt believes that the UK should commit at least 50 Challengers, in order to repel a new Russian offensive – and then mount a counter-offensive to win the war. Yet, neglecting the logistic and training requirements for introducing that number of new tanks, there is a serious question of whether there are even enough spare parts to keep them in service.

This is the tank about which Dannatt was writing a few days ago that they were “in dire need of an upgrade”. Now that 148 of the remaining 227 on the British inventory are to be upgraded, with entirely new spares requirements, it is almost certainly the case that the spares needed to support the Challenger 2 fleet have been allowed to run down.

Thus, in order to assess the utility of delivering Challenger 2s to Ukraine, four separate factors must be considered. The first is whether there are sufficient ammunition stocks to sustain these tanks in combat conditions – a problem that increases in intensity as the number of tanks fielded increases.

The second, and closely allied problem, is whether sufficient spares are available to support the fleet in the field, where intensive use is likely to increase demand far beyond levels experienced in peace time.

Here, it might be recalled that, in 2002/3 when the UK was preparing to send an armoured division to Iraq, comprising 128 Challenger 2s, the rest of the remaining fleet had to be cannibalised to ensure that the fighting tanks were fit for action. Unless much of the UK’s current fleet was immobilised, the spares reservoir is probably insufficient to prepare 50 tanks for action in Ukraine, and to keep them supported.

The next problem is whether the road and bridge structures in the areas of intended operation can actually support the weight of these heavy tanks, or whether the restrictions will hamper mobility to the extent that their value is much reduced.

Then there is the question of whether the specialised haulage capability is sufficient to support any new fleet of heavy tanks. On their own tracks, even modern tanks have limited range before needing maintenance and track renewal, which means that the preferred (and necessary) option is to move them any distance with tank transporters or rail flatbed trucks.

Both road and rail trucks capable of moving the massive loads involved are likely to be in limited supply, and not always positioned where they are needed most.

On top of all that, of course, is the need for training new crews in the use of these complex and unfamiliar tanks, and the training of servicing personnel for routine maintenance and repair, plus the field engineers who will be needed for running repairs and the recovery of broken-down tanks.

Thus, it is easy for the Telegraph to blather about giving the Ukrainians “the right tools to do the job”, arguing that “British-made tanks could deliver a knockout blow to Putin’s forces”. And The Times is little better, telling us that “Britain is right to give Zelensky the best battlefield armour”, compounding its ignorance with the comment: “If only it had more to give”.

Here, this paper concedes that a large-scale Ukrainian armoured offensive would need an injection of hundreds of modern tanks, while acknowledging that the UK does not have enough to offer that number. Thus, it concludes, more tanks “means Leopards or Abrams” – a handful of Challengers will make little difference.

But, with Leopard 2 tanks weighing between 62-66 tonnes, with Abrams tanks up to 73 tonnes, with both types presenting new complexities in the field, many of the problems attendant on introducing Challenger2s to Ukraine would also be experienced with these types, as this short video indicates.

Any problems encountered would be exacerbated by taking on several new types. Trying to absorb multiple types simultaneously would probably defeat most armies, to the extent that, if they were determined to re-equip, the Ukrainians would be best advised to stick to one new type.

In this, there may be some hard choices for Ukraine. Not only are we told that the UK has confirmed that it is planning to provide tanks to Ukraine, Poland has already decided to send a company of Leopards to Ukraine and Finland may follow.

If this then breaks the taboo, Germany might then be moved to supply Leopards from its stocks, and these tanks could start arriving in serious numbers. These would render the despatch of Challengers unnecessary. The move to send them will have served its purpose.

But, even then, Ukraine’s task would be only just beginning. Dealing with the mechanical aspects of new equipment is the easiest part. Integrating the operational use with other equipment learning how to deliver effective, combined arms manoeuvres, is the harder and more time-consuming part.

And contrary to the views of this intellectually challengered idiot, who believes the Challenger 2 “will help Ukraine triumph”, the best thing Ukraine could do is put any Challengers that do arrive into a museum, and get on with winning the war. But it won’t be fast, and it won’t be easy.