Ukraine: mood music

By Richard North - September 29, 2023

It’s a while since I’ve posted on Ukraine, but that does not mean that I regard the situation there as any less important than it’s always been. But the sensible operation security exercised by the Ukrainian military, and the lack of reliable independent sources, still makes it difficult to assess what is really going on.

As for the legacy media in the UK, for a small illustration – if any were needed – of the scattergun nature of the reporting we have an article in yesterday’s Telegraph offering the headline: “Putin has lost control of the war, head of UK army says on visit to Kyiv”, as its contribution to the sum of human knowledge.

This “head of UK army” is, according to the Telegraph, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin – another of those embarrassing infidelities which are far too common in this newspaper and detract substantially from its authority.

As to the money quote about Putin losing control, this is substantiated by citing Admiral Radakin, who says: “The recent strikes on the Black Sea Fleet are another example of how Ukraine retains the initiative. Putin has lost control of the war he started, and Russia is diminished as a consequence”.

Nothing else is provided to support the claim, which makes for an interesting contrast with a piece in yesterday’s copy of The Times which has: “Russian defensive lines stronger than West expected, admits British defence chief”.

The “defence chief” here is the self-same Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, upon whom the Telegraph relies, only this time round he is warning of a “long war” after the Ukraine counteroffensive has “failed to achieve [a] decisive breakthrough”.

As to Radakin’s more detailed view of the war, we learn from him via The Times that: “This is a visceral war where time and achievements get adjusted”. The Admiral adds: “What you’re seeing is a Ukraine adapting to some tough Russian defences but [that] has got the initiative and is grinding through and making progress”.

Radakin nevertheless suggests the war could drag on for some time. He warns that Ukraine’s ability to win the war depended on it being able to outlast Russia, saying that: “It’s the military that wins battles, but it’s the economics and that sustainability that tends to win wars”.

Actually, it’s a lot more than economics, especially with a nation such as Ukraine which does not have a defence industry or the physical resources sufficient to equip its own military, and which therefore has to rely on the charity of its allies and supporters to keep it in the fight.

Considering the question of whether Putin, or perhaps Zelensky, is losing control of the war, one cannot ignore the unease being expressed over the apparent deterioration in relations between Warsaw and Kiev, to the extent that Poland has ceased sending weapons to its beleaguered neighbour.

The situation provoked a commentary from George Byczynski, the chief adviser to the UK’s all-party parliamentary group on Poland, whose piece in the Telegraph was headlined: “Zelensky’s blunders risk alienating Ukraine’s allies”.

Byczynski acknowledges that the Ukrainian leadership, engaged in a relentless 19-month battle to defend their homeland, is under immense stress. But he is concerned about what he calls an “emerging pattern of diplomatic missteps” which he fears could weaken support from allies who have paid a high price in aid, weapons, and economic damage.

Perhaps the most glaring error, he suggests, is “the ill-advised trade dispute Ukraine has entered with Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary”, making a formal complaint to the WTO over banned grain and other food products.

While there have been complaints about Zelensky’s lack of gratitude, this, says Byczynski, goes beyond mere ingratitude: it signifies the initiation of animosities with steadfast friends who stood by Ukraine during its darkest hours.

Should this stance persist, he predicts that countries already bearing a significant burden in supporting Ukraine may reconsider or weaken their positions. But he doesn’t seem to be optimistic, citing Oleksiy Arestovich, a former adviser to Zelensky, who has said that Ukraine is entering “a self-destructive political spiral”.

From this, one could surmise that – when it comes to the overall management of the war – it is Zelensky who could be said to be in danger of losing his grip, more so when even the BBC has noticed that “it feels like the political knives are out” for Kiev.

While the media play games second-guessing who is on top in the political stakes, the reality on the ground, as the New York Times observes, is that a stalemate has settled on the battlefields.

Both sides started the year with lofty ambitions, the paper says. Russia wanted to capture the eastern Donbass region, while Ukraine aimed to split Russian forces with an attack in the south. Yet neither offensive has gone to plan. The front line, after months of gruelling combat and heavy casualties, remains largely unchanged.

In August, less territory changed hands than in any other month of the war. While Ukraine made small gains in the south, Russia took slightly more land overall, mostly in the northeast. Across the front line, every mile of territory has been a grinding fight, with no repeat of the rapid breakthrough that Kiev managed in Kharkiv in September of last year.

But perhaps a better feel of the situation comes from the very occasional glimpse we get of conditions and sentiment on the front lines. We saw this in my August piece and now we have another remarkable report, the one from the French daily Le Monde.

Its headline reads: “Ukrainian soldiers trained abroad express discontent: ‘I repeatedly told them NATO manuals didn’t apply’”, spelling out the experiences of some Ukrainian soldiers sent to learn modern combat techniques in the UK, Spain, Germany and Poland.

We’ve seen similar reports before, with one in August from the New York Times, which told us that Ukraine’s army had set aside US fighting methods and reverted to tactics it knew best.

Le Monde, however, adds caustic detail, with one Ukrainian soldier recounting his experience of training in the UK in July 2022. “The activities”, he says, “were entirely limited to infantry movements without enemy fire, shells, minefields or snipers, even though that is what we do every day on the ground”.

“Even the depth of the trenches was different from ours”, he complained, “and we were made to distinguish the different Russian vehicles without being told how to react if they came at us”. Since his return to the front, the soldier says, like many others, he has been learning about new weapons and tactics on YouTube.

But the comments of another soldier are particularly striking. He insists that the enemy should not be underestimated. “Russia doesn’t have a weak army, they have adapted very quickly”, he says. “They have a human reservoir that we don’t have and equipment in disarray”.

He suggests that NATO send people to the front for a month, for them to see that the situation changes every day. He makes no secret of his army’s difficulties: “As soon as we bring out any heavy equipment, it’s targeted by the Russians, and their defence system is very effective”.

Yet another soldier, who spent 35 days in England coordinating the training of 200 soldiers alongside British and Danish instructors, says he “repeatedly told them [his instructors] that the NATO manuals didn’t apply to Ukraine, like trench warfare”. Their reply was “that that’s how it was”. Everything was pre-determined.

This soldier observed that the instructors themselves do not always know exactly how to proceed. There were several occasions, he said, when they themselves had to go to YouTube to find solutions.

When he asked for exercises involving the use of drones, he was told that they were not included in NATO training, and yet they are an integral part of the war in Ukraine. “The only time we were able to have them was to observe our infantry manoeuvres from the air”, he said. “It’s the countries that are not fighting that do the teaching; it should be the other way round”.

For all the hype about “world-leading training in frontline combat skills”, therefore, the conclusion of all this is that the training provided by the NATO alliance is currently only basic level, suitable for new recruits with no military experience. When they return to Ukraine, they are not yet operational and need further training.

Yet the “European community” can still find the time to worry that Ukraine is one of the most carbon-intensive countries in Europe. With it looking to secure a “green transformation” as a priority, what can possibly go wrong?