Ukraine: no good ending

By Richard North - January 23, 2023

Post-Ramstein, one thing I neglected to mention was that Boris Pistorius promised to commission an audit of Bundeswehr holdings of Leopard 2s. And, with remarkable speed, it seems, he has made good on his promise.

Reported by Spiegel, we learn that the inventory runs to 312 tanks, of which 99 were in the hands of defence industry contractors undergoing maintenance and repairs, plus one which has already been scrapped.

Of the 212 on charge, there is a considerable spread of variants, ranging from A5, A6 and A7, the latter including the latest A7V variant. As of 22 May, a mere 53 of these latest variants were in service (sharing, incidentally, the same designation as the WWI tank fielded by the German Army in 1918).

Obviously not commented on by Spiegel – it was hardly relevant to its report – is the comparison with the British Army. Here, I have been caustic about an army which, in the 21st Century, is able to field more horses than tanks, sitting on 227 Challenger 2s, which are to be reduced to 148 of the upgraded 3 version.

But, by comparison, we have the mighty Heer, inheritor of the mantle of the mighty panzer armies of the ’40s (although we don’t talk about such things), which is actually able to field a mere 212 serviceable tanks, actually fewer than the number currently held by the Brits (until 14 are despatched to Ukraine) – although there are plans to upgrade 104 vehicles to A7V standard.

In the longer term, if the UK government stands by its plan to convert 148 tanks to Challenger 3 standard, then – in terms of the most modern tanks – the British Army will still operate more of the most modern tanks than the German Army – all of which illustrates the parlous state of the armoured forces available for duty.

This might explain, in part, the reticence of chancellor Scholz to be overly generous in donating these assets to Ukraine. The German army is already at rock bottom and has very little to give, without reducing power to below minimum critical levels – if it isn’t already there.

However, there are also practical issues that must be addressed before any donation to Ukraine is considered. Citing “Bundeswehr insiders”, Spiegel tells us that the most suitable variant to deliver to the Ukrainians would be the more basic (and less technically demanding) A5 variants, of which the Bundeswehr currently hold 19 in working condition, used to simulate “enemy forces” in the army’s combat training centre.

These are closer to the Polish A4 variants, which may be considered for donation to Ukraine. These could be upgraded to A5 standard, to confer the force homogeneity which would be necessary if the Ukrainian Army was to operate them as a single cohesive force.

In an example of grown-up reporting that we’re not seeing elsewhere, Spiegel tells us that “putting together such a package is technically not trivial”. For example, is says, most Leopard 2 tanks in Europe are equipped with hydraulic turret controls, while the Bundeswehr models have electrical controls.

Although this might appear to be an obscure technical issue, experience has shown that fitting electrical controls substantially enhances battlefield survivability, and is a modification well worth having. And while a mixed fleet could be fielded, a homogeneous fleet would simplify repair and maintenance requirements which must already be at nightmare levels.

Interestingly, while the rhetoric on speedy delivery of Leopard 2s continues to pour from the Western media, with the idiot Johnson putting his oar in, during a surprise visit to Kiev, such considerations vastly complicate the delivery of Western tanks to Ukraine and may further explain the delays.

Thus, while Scholz is in the frame for not approving the re-export for Leopard 2s from Poland (and possibly Finland and other countries), Deutsche Welle tells us that Berlin has not yet been formally asked for permission. On the other hand, foreign minister Annalena Baerbock told French television yesterday that, if Poland wanted to send Leopards to Ukraine, Germany would not stand in its way.

It is not untoward to hypothesise that the lack of formal requests – after the sugar-rush of high-profile donor announcements triggered by the UK decision to send a squadron of (largely useless) Challenger 2s – reflects a more mature recognition of the technical complexities of providing battle-ready tank units to a country already at war.

Thus, it is not necessarily to Ukraine’s advantage to have president Macron announce that he might be prepared to donate Leclerc MBTs.

Not least, the French fleet, now reduced to a mere 254 units, is probably in much the same parlous state as other national fleets. Last time I saw a substantial number of Leclercs was in an open-air tank park outside Verdun, and a sorry sight they looked.

As it stands, the French only have 96 of the more modern XXI versions of a tank that was first produced in 1990, and even these date back to 2007. Like other countries, the French are undertaking a modernisation programme for their fleet, planning to upgrade 200 units to the so-called XLR standard.

The first of 18 the upgrades, though, won’t come off the production line until this year and the programme is not due for completion until 2029. Any tanks that Macron could donate to the Ukrainians would not be a substantial advance on what they already have and would add to their logistics and maintenance burden.

If anything, therefore, the main effect of the call from Ukraine for more modern tanks has been  to catch out the West, demonstrating how ill-prepared most European Nato powers are for armoured warfare.

The “peace dividend” from the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 has hollowed out military capabilities in much of Europe to the extent that there are few nations which any longer are capable of fielding a credible force.

That, according to Forbes, leaves Poland as Ukraine’s best hope for its re-equipment needs. Currently, Polish land forces operate just under 250 Leopard 2s, split between 140 A4s, and 105 A5s.

Forbes argues that, with more than a thousand of the latest American and South Korean tanks scheduled to arrive in Poland over the next decade, the Poles could start giving their Leopards to Ukraine right now and suffer, at worst, a fleeting capability gap.

However, the bulk of the Polish fleet, comprising aged A4s, acquired second-hand from the Bundeswehr in 2002, is not in a battleworthy condition – as Turkish experience has shown.

The Poles, therefore, have been undertaking their own modernisation programme, to a unique Leopard 2PL standard, but the programme is not due for completion until this year. Even with all the improvements, though, this variant is not as capable as the upgraded Leopard 2A7V.

Poland’s full re-equipment programme, taking in over a thousand Korean K2 MBTs, doesn’t start to get under way until 2026 and, in the current febrile atmosphere, it is unlikely that the Poles will accept a prolonged capability gap.

Realistically, therefore, even with a fair wind and the full cooperation of the Germans, the most Ukraine can expect in the foreseeable future is a hundred or so Western tanks. Enough to equip a single armoured brigade, this is very far from a decisive force.

In any event, the chances of it being fully operational within the year seem extremely remote, by which time the situation on the battle lines might look significantly different, and not necessarily to the advantage of Ukraine.

Basically, the offers of “tanks for Ukraine” begin to look more like empty posturing than any serious offer of help, hampered by the lack of preparedness and the sheer complexity of modern equipment, which can no longer be produced (or upgraded) at speed.

It seems to me that, if Europe is to render effective assistance to Ukraine, it must mobilise its defence industries and put them on a war footing, committing to the expenditure of hundreds of million euros.

Since there is no sign of that happening, once again it will be up to the United States to come to the rescue of Europe, which does not seem very likely. On the basis of what we know, this does not end well.