Ukraine: the limit of tolerance

By Richard North - March 28, 2022

Just because we’re hearing stuff from supposedly unimpeachable sources doesn’t necessarily mean it makes sense, and especially when it’s broadcast on a quiet Sunday when there’s nothing much in the way of major developments to report.

Top of the list in this category, at the moment, is an assertion by General Kyrylo Budanov, head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. In a formal statement issued yesterday, he says that Putin’s new war aim is to partition his country much like the Korean Peninsula after World War II.

“The occupiers will try to cobble together the occupied territories into a single quasi-state entity that will oppose independent Ukraine. We already see an attempt to create ‘parallel’ authorities in the occupied territories and force people to give up the hryvnia. Perhaps they will want to bargain about this at the international level”, Budanov said.

To an extent, though, this has to be a “No Shit Sherlock!” moment, as that has been seen as one of Putin’s aims right from the beginning of the war – albeit not his sole aim. Now that he has apparently abandoned the idea of occupying Kiev in order to achieve regime change, one presumes Budanov means that this has now become the sole aim of the Russian invaders.

To that effect, we are told (in this case by one of the many newspapers to cover the story), that officials in Kiev are saying that they expect troops attacking the capital and the embattled city of Kharkiv to move east within two weeks.

There is precious little extra detail offered, but even if it was provided, I suspect that this development would make little more sense than it does now. At least part of the reason (if not the whole purpose) of deploying forces to threaten Kiev, and other cities in Ukraine, was – we averred, citing no less an authority than Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy – to tie down Ukrainian troops and resources in their defence, thus preventing reinforcement of operations in the Donbass region.

It is there, one assumes, that the split is to occur, together with the Azov Sea littoral and Crimea, creating an east-west split rather than the north-south division that we see with Korea.

Apart from this not being a terribly good analogy (to which I will return shortly), the reason this doesn’t make a lot of sense is precisely because redirecting Russian troops from around Kiev and other areas would also allow the Ukrainians to redeploy their forces, in an attempt to pre-empt the Russian moves.

The point here is that, if you look at the positioning of some of the Russian formations, such as those in Irpin and other areas to the west of Kiev, recovering them and then repositioning them on an entirely new front would be quite a lengthy operation – discounting the administrative and logistical issues.

The effect of that would be to give the Ukrainians a temporary and possibly decisive advantage. Relying on shorter, internal lines of communication, they could shift troops and support elements to new locations along the eastern front much quicker than could the Russians.

Even if they do not necessarily have the full complement of military transport, the Ukrainians can always rely on civilian resources, using commercial trucks to shift equipment, and buses and coaches to move troops to their new locations. And, as the troops initially will be adopting defensive or blocking positions, they will have less need for field mobility.

The Russians, on the other hand, who are demonstrably weak in support elements, generally rely on the railway system for their large-scale military movements. But it has long been the case that the links between the Ukrainian rail system, and those in Belarus and Russia, have been cut. The Russians would be forced to rely on their already hard-pressed road transport fleet.

Furthermore, the weather is not in their favour. Already, largely thanks to the polar vortex which has brought record snows to the far east and northern China, Ukraine has enjoyed a relatively mild winter, with the temperatures often above freezing in many areas of the country.

Now, as we move into spring, the warmer season and the rains that accompany it will bring on the notorious rasputitsa, the sea of mud that has hindered invading armies from the 13th century Mongols through to those of Napoleon and Hitler, right up to the present.

What may also have a significant effect on the conduct of operations in the eastern combat area is the extremely limited road network – so limited that it barely qualifies for the term “network”.

Here, given that the Ukrainians will deny to the invaders the use of their own rail system, there is a seemingly small but nevertheless important detail which could further amplify the adverse effects of the road availability. The movement of tanks and other tracked vehicles over the distances involved will require the use of a considerable number of tank transporters.

What is not widely appreciated though is that there has been a sea change in the provision of such equipment in the Russian army. In Soviet days, one of the primary movers was the formidable MAZ-537, with unrivalled cross-country performance. But to replace these ageing vehicles, the new “workhorse” has become the KamAZ-65225 (pictured), which lacks power and off-road mobility and is only suitable for heavy-duty metalled roads – especially when laden.

Although a new high-mobility transporter, in the KamAZ-78504, was to be made available, this seems to have been another casualty of the Russian army’s failed modernisation programme, leaving it dangerously short of a vital field capability.

Without the ability to deliver large numbers of tracked vehicles, the army will have to rely on the vehicles reaching their destinations under their own power, wearing out the equipment before it is even deployed, and stacking up huge maintenance problems.

In short, therefore, the Russian plan to redeploy some of its forces eastwards – if indeed that is the plan, and not merely Ukrainian intelligence blowing hot air – is not anything like as simple as it sounds. And, if the faster, more nimble Ukrainian forces get there first, well-armed with man-portable anti-tank weapons, the Russians could be in for a pile of grief.

This brings us back to the idea of splitting the country Korean-style which – even if it was a remotely practical proposition – could be seriously handicapped by the current military situation.

The problem at hand is that the Korean split was finalised on the basis of the recognition of a border defined by the positions of the opposing armies when the fighting was brought to a halt with the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement on 27 July 1953.

In that the Russian forces are nowhere near, as yet, attaining their objective of controlling the entire Donetsk and Lugansk administrative regions, one cannot imagine Putin being prepared to consider a similar armistice, with the de facto border defined by current troop positions.

But, given that the Ukraine forces may be able to block Putin’s ambitions, the “Korean option” simply becomes a recipe for a prolonged, increasingly bitter war, where the Ukrainians do not have have to win, as such, but avoid losing. And if the West, spurred on by Biden and Johnson, are prepared in the name of Nato to support a proxy war against Russia, this is a recipe for a never-ending war.

However, while there is currently strong support in the West for embattled Ukraine, sentiment can change. On Saturday, I received a letter from my utilities provider telling me that my combined gas and electricity bill is to increase by £1,000 on the year – an increase attributed to Ukraine.

The war in Ukraine is also triggering massive disruptions to the supply chain, there is a very real prospect of food shortages arising from the disruption in planting in the areas where there is fighting, and the price of fertiliser is at a record high, ensuring that food prices will continue to increase.

We are even told that the completion of the Hinkley Point nuclear power station is to be further delayed because of the war, adding even higher costs to the project.

Under the combined effects of massive price increases, for many proving to be unaffordable, and growing shortages of key commodities, as well as a huge range of consumer goods – and as the effects of a long-term refugee crisis bite – the limit of tolerance for a prolonged war may be reached, especially if, as some predict, we are plunged into a global recession.

If he can manage to stay in power, and Russia can weather the effects of the sanctions, all Putin has to do is wait. The West may blink first and, as military support to Ukraine dries up, a renewed Russian offensive could achieve its president’s aims.

This may point to another dimension of this war. While Ukraine, with Nato support, could win it on the battlefield by dint of forcing a stalemate, there may be no appetite in the West for a prolonged war. The public may yet have the last word, forcing a settlement on their leaders.