Defence: death by trivia

By Richard North - March 23, 2024

My comments on the media, made in my Thursday piece stand.

As I society, I ventured, we simply cannot afford to submerge ourselves in unserious trivia and irrelevances and over-indulge in emotive reporting. For while we are thus distracted, there are any number of issues vital to our national interest that must be addressed if we are going to survive and prosper.

Although it is hard to believe from the torrent of coverage on the princess of Wales that we see today, it is possible to cover the latest revelations, and to express sympathy and concern for a human being afflicted by a serious and potentially fatal illness, without turning the media into a three-ring circus.

Aside from that current obsession, I doubt there would be much disagreement that, of the many issues that need thorough, sustained and consistent coverage, Ukraine is very high up the list especially if, as I have argued, the war is lost.

First and foremost, if the defeat of Ukraine militarily is even a strong possibility, we should be entertaining as of now a national conversation on the implications of that event, to Ukraine, to continental Europe, global stability and to the safety and the standing of the UK.

This cannot be an academic discussion as, potentially, if some of the worst fears come to pass, and Putin is ready to attack Nato, then not only do we have to think seriously about the potential consequences and our response, that thinking must become part of our political dialogue which should shape our voting intentions at the general election.

In essence, if we accept that Russia’s actions represent an existential threat, then defence as an issue needs to be elevated to the top of our list of priorities and we should be looking at the intentions and the capabilities of the two main parties, and their proposals for safeguarding the nation and meeting our Nato commitments.

In that respect, certain analogies can be drawn with the pre-WWII scenario, putting us in a situation similar to that which we faced in 1938, post-Munich, when war seemed inevitable, and we were beginning to realise how unprepared we were to meet the threat that Nazi Germany represented.

Taking a slightly more optimistic stance, we could equate our situation with the pre-Munich scenario, when there seemed a possibility that war could be avoided. Transferred to the present context, that would mean exploring means by which military defeat in Ukraine could be avoided, or a peaceful settlement negotiated.

That, of course, begs the question as to whether, in the current circumstances, staving off defeat is even possible and, if it is, whether we are willing or able to pay what would amount to a substantial price. Failing that, we might consider revisiting Chamberlain’s strategy of negotiating, directly or indirectly with the “enemy” in this case Russia.

The task in that latter case would be to achieve a settlement which would bring the fighting to an end, and restore some sense of stability, perhaps even on a standstill basis, leaving an agreement on the occupied territories to a later date.

Leaving that aside for the moment and addressing the question as to whether it is possible to achieve a military solution, that raises two linked questions. The first is why the Ukrainian effort has so far failed to achieve success, and the second is an examination of what is needed to remedy the military shortfalls which would bring success.

There is, of course, a side issue here, in that one would need explore the implications of imposing a military defeat on Putin’s Russia, with an assessment of whether that would provoke retaliation of other events which might be worse than a limited Russian victory over Ukraine.

All of these questions, of course, are linked and there can be no gainsaying the fact that they are complex and uncertain. To decide what is needed to defeat Russia on the ground in Ukraine, for instance, would require an honest and far-reaching examination of the reasons for failure, otherwise any measures based on “more of the same” might end up perpetuating the failure only on a larger scale.

As it stands, we have some insight into why the military effort is failing, some clear thinking as to some of the current equipment limitations (which could be expanded upon).

I also like to think that there are lessons from history which could help shape future operations and I remain convinced that one of the closest parallels to the current situation is Montgomery’s 1942 second battle of el Alamein.

Of one thing I am absolutely certain, though, is that the current policy of dumping cast-off Western equipment on Ukraine is not going to achieve results – more so since writing yesterday’s piece. There are special features to the Ukrainian theatre which require equipment to be specifically tuned to the requirements of that theatre.

One must recall in this context, that the bulk of the army equipment held by Nato powers was designed for a defensive battle in the special circumstances of western Europe – and mainly northern Germany – against a massed attack by Soviet forces.

It is now evident (and should have been at the inception of hostilities) that the ground conditions in Ukraine and very different from those in western Europe, as is the style of fighting. A different mix of equipment is most certainly needed, with types provided which are more suited to the conditions.

Of interest here is the approach of the Chinese to their provision of armoured vehicles. While the PLA has followed the Western pattern of manufacturing Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) – latterly with the Type 99, which is the match of anything fielded by Nato armies – it has also recognised that the heavy weight of the MBT renders it unsuitable for all theatres.

To cope with the special conditions of Tibet, for instance, with a poor road infrastructure and weak bridges, it has developed what is designated as a “light” tank – still weighing up to 36 tonnes – the ZTQ-15 (pictured).

Although the gun is not a match for the modern MBT, its tube-launched ATGW could take out any tank and, at half the weight of the Challenger with the same engine power, this type of tank would be a formidable adversary on the battlefields of Ukraine – pointing up the need to make equipment to fit the prevailing conditions.

As it happens, the US Army has a not dissimilar vehicle just coming into service, the M-10 Booker which, at 38-42 tonnes, would be far more suitable on the battlefields of Ukraine that the overweight M-1 Abrams. In sufficient quantities, integrated with other weapons, these could make the difference between success and failure.

The crucial caveat, though, is quantity. A few dozen vehicles are neither here nor there. I have always held that for a major counter-offensive, Ukraine needs to be able to field upwards of 600 tanks (with replacements for losses), with matching levels of MICVs, artillery and supporting arms – and that’s without factoring in air power.

What immediately transpires is that the UK has neither the appropriate types equipment nor the capacity to arm Ukraine, so all we could do as a nation is use our influence to persuade the United States to come to the rescue, while providing such peripheral support as we are able.

And here emerges the brutal truth that, having let our army shrink in size and our manufacturing capacity dwindle, we are in no position to support Ukraine, even if we wanted to (and neither does Europe). The entire weight of the British Army, with everything we had, would probably only make a marginal difference.

Thus, I think, we must start looking to our own national self-interest. In the absence of any realistic plan to arm Ukraine with the right sort of equipment at the scale needed, we need to come to terms with the possibility of a defeated nation and work up a policy on how to deal with it.

We can, on the other hand, allow ourselves to be distracted by non-essentials and trivia, and avoid confronting the necessary decisions, resigning ourselves to the prospect of a dangerous and uncertain world, for which we are completely unprepared.

If that is our choice, then it is a conscious choice we need to make, rather than sleepwalk into oblivion for want of that national conversation. Death by trivia would be a sad end to a once-proud nation.