Middle East: a state of flux

By Richard North - April 18, 2026

The thing to remember about the Middle East is that nothing is over until it is over and, where grudge matches span millennia, nothing is ever really over. Thus, optimism through yesterday about the latest developments may be a little bit premature.

It started when Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, posted a statement on X declaring: “In line with the ceasefire in Lebanon, the passage for all commercial vessels through Strait of Hormuz is declared completely open for the remaining period of ceasefire, on the coordinated route as already announced by Ports and Maritime Organisation of the Islamic Rep. of Iran”.

This was picked up and widely publicised, following which president Trump happily responded with his own social media post stating that, “the Strait of Hormuz is completely open and ready for business”, although he did add that the naval blockade remained in full force.

This though, he said, was only going to be “until such time as our transaction with Iran 100 percent complete”, adding that “this process should go very quickly in that most points are already negotiated.

The Beltway insider Axios then recorded that Trump had told it that US and Iranian negotiators would probably meet this weekend, and he expected them to hammer out a final deal to end the war.

This plan, it was claimed, comprised a three-page memorandum of understanding, with one element under discussion being that the US would release $20 billion in frozen Iranian funds in return for Iran giving up its stockpile of enriched uranium.

Iran had agreed during the negotiations to commit to “a very, very powerful statement… that they will not have nuclear weapons” and had also agreed to give the US what Trump called “the nuclear dust”,” referring to the enriched uranium stockpile, amounting to some 450 Kg enriched to 60 percent.

“We are very close to making a deal. If no deal, fire resumes”, Trump said, making it clear that he was willing to extend the ceasefire if needed, beyond its 21 April expiration.

As the New York Times later recorded, this was Trump on a “media tear”, granting interviews and unleashing a flurry of social media posts that framed peace talks with Iran as all but complete.

But it was not to be. Twelve hours after, Abbas Araghchi had posted his statement, Iran’s parliament speaker published a six-point counter-signature on his verified X account. This was hard-liner Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the lead Iranian negotiator, a former IRGC commander and former Tehran mayor.

The President of the United States, said Ghalibaf, made seven claims in one hour, all seven of which were false. They did not win the war with these lies, and they will certainly not get anywhere in negotiations either.

With the continuation of the blockade, he went on to say, the Strait of Hormuz will not remain open. Passage through the Strait will be conducted based on the “designated route” and with “Iranian authorisation”.

“Whether the Strait is open or closed and the regulations governing it will be determined by the field, not by social media”, he then stated, adding: “Media warfare and engineering public opinion are an important part of war, and the Iranian nation is not affected by these tricks”.

Aljazeera quickly joined in with a report headlined: “Iran rejects Trump claim on deal to surrender nuclear material stockpiles”, referring to Ismail Baghaei, the regime’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson. He had stated on Iranian national TV that enriched uranium was tied to national sovereignty and would not be transferred “under any circumstances”.

These apparent contradictions were explained by a prominent analyst, who suggested that there is a verbal civil war internally among the IRGC and the mullahs. Trump’s announcement that they agreed to no enrichment had come as a shock to many regime figures, who saw it as either fake or a betrayal.

Although the president has all-but proclaimed unambiguous victory, she thinks that this may have been Trump’s plan all along. Trump’s strategy right now, she avers, is to loudly declare that the regime has agreed to everything, then lean back and watch them tear each other apart in confusion and finger-pointing.

The IRGC was initially furious that Ghalibaf was seen to be making deals with America while Khamenei senior is still in a freezer, unburied, after they killed him, and the rift should not be underestimated.

One regime figure had a meltdown and then deleted his X account. Others are calling for Araghchi to be impeached, while Ghalibaf is now calling all of Trump’s posts lies. The regime’s communications are an absolute shambles.

In effect, this is Iran’s “Mosaic Defence” falling apart – the military doctrine designed to ensure the country’s survival and continued fighting capability even if its central leadership is killed or its communications are destroyed.

Developed primarily by the IRGC following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, the strategy aimed to prevent a rapid systemic collapse of the nature seen under Saddam Hussein. Each element of the state comes under decentralised control, in theory making defeat impossible by turning the country into a “war without a centre”.

But the net result is to fragment the ruling structure of the regime, splitting it into rival factions with no single one dominant, or strong enough to overcome the others. No-one is in overall charge, with Khamenei Jr having taken over as supreme leader rumoured to be either dead or in a coma, so the regime no longer speaks with a single voice.

As the cracks begin to show, Saeed Jalil, a key regime member took to X asking whether the agreement with Trump has been approved by the supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei. If that is the case, he wrote, let’s hear it from his mouth and we will obey, thereby casting doubt on whether Mojtaba is still alive.

Jalili is an ultraconservative. He was Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator (2007-2013), secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and a presidential candidate in 2024. He is a hardline figure, loyal to the Supreme Leader. Following his post, he deactivated his account after his intervention was taken as criticising officials for allegedly falsifying Khamenei’s orders.

His disappearance and previous posts have led to speculation that a soft coup is in progress, with Jalili stating that the infrastructure is “on the verge of collapse”, after which “a better foundation will be built”.

As regards the situation in the ground, this is no clearer than the political picture. In the Strait of Hormuz, nothing seems to have changed. Reports indicate that Iran’s conditions for ships to exit the Strait are the same rules that it imposed before. Several tankers and cargo ships tried to exit the Strait yesterday but turned back.

Later reports – as of the early hours of this morning – speak of unexplained activity in the Gulf with “massive movement” of shipping out of Dubai and Sharjah ports followed by vessels making sudden U-turns in the exact same area and heading back to port.

As the second round of talks is set to resume in Islamabad, everything is up in the air and there seems no real prospect of agreement. If the regime leaders cannot even agree amongst themselves, then there seems little likelihood that they can agree a deal with Trump.

And then there is Lebanon, a story all its own – one to which we will return.