Politics: contradictions

By Richard North - February 19, 2022

There is a penalty for focussing on the exercises in Belarus, and the possibility of southwards thrusts to invest Kiev. It has diverted attention from eastern Ukraine and, in particular, from the separatist-controlled areas carved out of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

But, since some of the saner pundits have regarded this area as the potential flash-point – where the intervention of Russian forces is most likely – it is perhaps appropriate that on this, the penultimate day of the joint exercises in Belarus, attention is returning to these disputed areas.

How, though, we even begin to evaluate recent events is anybody’s guess. First we have the background of a recorded increase in ceasefire violations along the so-called “line of contact” forming the front line between Ukrainian government and separatist forces.

Then we have seen a car bomb in Donetsk, close to separatist headquarters, and another explosion hitting an oil pipeline in Luhansk. Both are suspected of being “false-flag” operations, bombs planted by Russian agents to legitimise military action. The Times suggests that a “false flag” attack is yet to come.

As it now stands, an “unprecedented” evacuation of civilians has been ordered, with (supposed) preparations made to bus as many as 700,000 (many of whom hold Russian passports) over the border to the Russian region of Rostov for an indeterminate period – apparently coordinated with the “Russian leadership”.

Putin is said to have announced that the Russian government will pay 10,000 roubles ($130) to every “refugee” arriving in the country. He has also ordered the head of the ministry for emergency situations to fly immediately to Rostov to organise the evacuation and arrivals.

The BBC headlines accusations of this being a “fake crisis”, with the US state department calling the evacuation a “cynical” move by Moscow “to distract the world from the fact that Russia is building up its forces in preparation for an attack”. Unsurprisingly, the separatists see things differently.

Faked or not, in the soon to be vacated areas, there are two obvious scenarios, which may come to pass, depending on whether this area is to become the crucible in which the battles are to be fought.

The first is that the Russians will exploit the developments to feed in (more) troops and equipment, to protect the areas cleared of their civilian inhabitants. This might be expected to prompt a reaction from the Ukraine government (and its Western supporters) which could include military action and/or the application of sanctions.

Another possibility is that Ukrainian government forces, emboldened by the withdrawal of the citizenry, move in to attempt a recovery of the disputed territories. This might then provoke a Russian military response, which need not be constrained to the disputed areas.

Any such move could amount to a significant land grab to the west of the disputed areas – surrounding and isolating Ukrainian forces committed to the occupation of the disputed areas. We could then see active fighting, one outcome of which could be the severe degradation of Ukrainian fighting power, possibly paving the way for an eventual political settlement.

Any number of other scenarios are, of course, possible – limited only by the power of the imagination. One could even envisage a full-blown nuclear war – however unlikely that might seem – facilitated by the “strategic deterrence force drills” (aka nuclear exercises) which are to be carried out today under the direct supervision of Putin, alongside Alexander Lukashenko from Belarus.

According to the Guardian, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said Putin would take part in the exercise from a defence ministry operations centre. “Even test launches of this type are impossible without the head of state”, he said. “You all know about his famed ‘black briefcase’, ‘the red button’ and so on”.

Although these are scheduled exercises, brought forward from the autumn – noted by the news agency Tass in early January – the coincidence with the final days of the exercises in Belarus, along with other developments, does not assist in calming an already tense atmosphere. US military and intelligence officials, for instance, are treating the exercises – which are held annually – as a warning to Nato not to intervene if Putin decides to invade Ukraine.

Apart from the Financial Times, though, UK national newspapers today seem so unconcerned about the prospect – by their own reckoning – of Europe on the brink of war that they have not bothered to run it prominently on their front pages. Storm “Eunice” is given pride of place.

Nevertheless, the online edition of the Telegraph has Biden convinced that Putin has made the decision to invade Ukraine “within days”.

Asked how the US could be certain, Biden is reported as saying: “We have significant intelligence capability”. Secretary of state Blinken argues that the information “is validated by what we’ve seen unfolding in plain sight before our eyes for months”. Ever persistent, Putin continues to maintain that the exercises are “purely defensive” and “not a threat to any other country”.

Still, Biden believes that Putin’s invasion will include a targeted attack on Kiev, that possibility also continuing to be endorsed by the UK MoD, despite the obvious difficulties and the lack of plausibility.

And even though US estimates now put Russian forces at 190,000 – including naval and air force personnel (and presumably, also National Guard troops), this is still a modest commitment for an undertaking as large as is apparently planned.

Given that there are no easy invasion routes from Belarus, from which an attack on Kiev could be mounted, the question might be asked as to why exercises in that country should be used as a “cover” for an invasion, when much easier and certain alternatives might have been chosen – and in somewhat more advantageous weather conditions.

It also should be said that the fear of military exercises being used as cover for an invasion is by no means new. During the Cold War, Nato forces were often placed on high alert when Warsaw Pact exercises were being carried out, to guard against the possibility of a real attack.

However, in such scenarios, the attack would be expected at the beginning of the exercises, not at the end when supplies were depleted, the equipment was worn and the men were tired. Thus, as the Belarus exercises come to an end after ten days of manoeuvres, one might expect this to be the least likely time those forces would be committed to further action.

With the Mail on the case, showing photographs of Russian T-72B tanks loaded on flatcars (amazingly identified as named tank types) “at an unknown location on the border with Ukraine”, further contradictions arise.

Close inspection shows these to be late-model B3s, with cage armour modifications which were introduced around 2017. But what is significant about the pictures is that the tanks are shown without their armoured “skirts” – essential parts of their protection. Without these, the tanks cannot be considered battle-worthy, and re-fitting them is no quick task. Before they do anything else, these tanks are destined for the workshop.

Deduct the equipment (and the men) who have been engaged in active manoeuvres for the last two weeks or so and the forces available for active duty begin to look far less impressive – more so when you discount those forces which are stationed at their permanent bases which just happen to be deemed within striking distance of the Ukraine border.

Rational analysis, therefore, suggest that the sheer scale of the challenge – and the (relatively) modest resources available – continue to militate against a full-blown invasion – even if actions centred on eastern Ukraine can never be ruled out.

Yet, that does not stop the pundits seeking to put the case for the finger that “has tightened around the trigger”, with “a small, ever diminishing, chance it might not be pulled”. Whether that concern will outlive the next storm or the next passing distraction remains to be seen.