Ukraine: mutually reinforcing failure

By Richard North - June 23, 2022

There seems to be some disagreement over the precise status of the battle for Sievierodonetsk, with suggestions that Lysychansk salient is about to be closed, trapping an unspecified number of Ukrainian troops. Others will have it that most of the troops have already evacuated or are in the process of so doing.

However, with many different scenarios possible, and no insight into the thinking of senior commanders from either side, it would be unwise to predict any particular outcome, or even rule out unexpected developments. But there is certainly a sense that the near two-month-old battle is coming to a climax.

Yet, through the fog of war, one thing is reasonably clear. The Ukrainians, after originally planning to vacate the city of Sievierodonetsk after only a token fight, changed tack and decided to make a stand. They have therefore invested considerable emotional and human capital in the defence of the city. Their forcible eviction – if it comes – will be seen as something of a setback.

Furthermore, if the Ukrainians are unable to stop the Russians from taking control of the entire Luhansk Oblast, which will have been achieved by securing the capture of the twin cities, then this does not bode well for their chances of success in the much harder task of driving the invaders back to the pre-24 February lines.

This brings us back to the theme of yesterday’s piece and the question of whether Ukraine’s supporters are prepared to commit a sufficient level of support in the long-term – that level, in terms of weapons and ammunition, being significantly higher than has already been provided.

As a pointer to difficulties to come, only yesterday, it was learned that a deal based on Slovakia donating 30 modernised T-72s to Ukraine in exchange for being given Leopard 2A4s from Germany has collapsed after Berlin notified Bratislava that it could only provide 15 tanks. The Slovaks say they need 30 for a tank battalion, so they could not proceed on that basis.

But the reality is that the broader difficulties confronting Ukraine are already priced into the support equation, with many US officials privately doubting that the besieged country will be able to fully expel Russian forces in the near or medium term. Any such aims, they say, would doom Kiev to an endless war.

These sentiments were aired in a Washington Post article nearly three weeks ago, alongside a commentary from Nato chief Jens Stoltenberg, who was driven to say that Nato members should support Ukraine’s efforts to achieve a battlefield outcome that would ultimately lead to a negotiated end to the conflict.

Stoltenberg was back in print on the 18th, in Bild am Sontag warning (once again) that the war could last for years but that should not stop Nato members from supporting Ukraine.

Without that support, depriving Ukraine of the ability to hold down Russian ambitions, Putin will take from this war that he can simply carry on as he did after the 2008 war in Georgia and the occupation of Crimea in 2014. Then, says Stoltenberg, “we will pay a much higher price”.

This concept of inactivity carrying a higher price in the longer term found its way into Izvestia yesterday, following a press conference in Brussels when Stoltenberg once again rehearsed what is becoming a well-worn theme.

But, even if the truth of this is self-evident, there has been no coherent response to the specific demand from Mykhailo Podoliak, head of Zelensky’s office, for “parity” with the Russians in heavy weapons. To end the war and throw Russia out of Ukraine, he wanted 1,000 155 mm howitzers, 300 MLRS, 500 tanks, 2,000 units of armoured vehicles and 1,000 drones.

Although this has been treated in some quarters as the opening pitch in a negotiation, the numbers represent a realistic (and possibly understated) level of equipment which would be needed to evict the Russians from Donbass.

What would not be realistic though is any idea that such equipment, on its own, could be a war-winner. To absorb such equipment into the order of battle, into an effective command structure, led by trained commanders and manned by experienced troops, would require a lengthy hiatus, during which the Russians would be unlikely to cooperate by standing down until the Ukrainians are ready to do battle.

Looking at the situation objectively, though, the chances of Ukraine’s supporters organising themselves to deliver the amount of kit requested are beyond remote. The most likely response will be the delivery of penny-packets of equipment, over an extended time period, with pressure to commit each new arrival to battle as soon as it becomes available.

That alone would deprive the Ukrainians of the opportunity of concentrating their forces to project the shock effect which only mass can achieve, and thereby secure dominance of the battlefield.

Digging into historical parallels, which do have their uses, one is minded of Montgomery when he took command of the Eighth Army in North Africa in August 1942. Under immense pressure to bring the Germans to battle, he held off until late October when he was satisfied that his army had the equipment it needed and was sufficiently trained.

But if that is something like what the Ukrainians should be aiming for, it is hard to see how they can achieve it. For a start, there is not the convenient funnel of the Mediterranean coast and the Qattara Depression, in which to bottle up the enemy.

In short, the Ukrainians do not have the strategic initiative. They must fight their battles as they are presented, with the equipment that they have at the time – over which they have little control.

Thus, the more one explores future prospects, the more it seems that the most likely scenario is not only a long war but also an inconclusive one, where the Ukrainians are never able to achieve a victory which will open the way to peace negotiations – assuming the Russians would entertain them without adequate leverage.

Having started to explore this yesterday, one must also take into account the effects of sanctions in bringing the Russians to the table, and the consequences of an economic war with Russia, when the gas is turned off. And, if this analysis by the New York Times is any guide, they are less powerful then we might wish. In the longer-term, they are probably unsustainable – for the Western economies.

The role of sanctions is, of course, highly contentious, but then so is the application of military power to achieve an effect. The most recent attempts to secure fundamental change by the force of arms have not been covered in glory.

It seems, therefore, that we are relying on a composite strategy, leveraging military action alongside economic sanctions, neither arm of which has any chance (as constituted) of working in isolation. Presumably, the expectation is that the combination might have the desired effect.

On the other hand, logic might suggest that combining two sub-optimal paths will not necessarily create the conditions for success. Instead, we could end up with the phenomenon of mutually reinforcing failure.

Next week, Zelensky will be virtually addressing the G7 and Nato summits, in an attempt to strengthen support and to direct more action against Russia. But, nearly four months down the line, it is becoming clear that we do not yet have a working strategy.

It may well be that we need more time to assess the effect, and that the stresses on Russia will only act slowly. At best, they could trigger regime change and transform the negotiating environment, in which case all we have to do is bide our time.

Such a route, though, lacks any certainty, while the consequences of failure could be intolerable, both economically and in terms of lives lost. This is unacceptable. Any strategy must be harnessed to a reasonable chance of success, rather than relying on wishful thinking.

If Zelensky cannot come up with anything better than we have already, then the G7 and Nato groupings will have to do his thinking for him. In this, the cold reality which is emerging is that there are no desirable outcomes from this mess. The choice is between a series of unattractive options, where individual or national ambitions are unlikely to be realised.