Ukraine: peace in our time

By Richard North - July 3, 2022

Persistent social media reports suggest that Lysychansk has been taken by the Russians. There is no official confirmation though, and the last published report from Ukrinform had fierce fighting ongoing in what was described as a “difficult” situation.

The BBC is splitting the difference with a report stating that the city is “at the centre of competing claims”, with both Russian and Ukrainian forces saying they are in control. Russian media, however, has published videos of separatist or Russian forces apparently parading through the streets, and is claiming that Ukrainian forces have retreated.

Either way, it can only be a matter of time before the claims are resolved – in Russia’s favour. The reality is that the city is close to being encircled and supply lines are under continuous Russian bombardment, making it difficult for the Ukrainians to keep up the fight. Some suggest that the bulk of their forces have already withdrawn to more defensible positions, to the west of the city.

When the dust has settled, the capture of the city will mark the almost total annexation of Luhansk Oblast, clearing the way for the Russians to focus on the remainder of Donetsk Oblast. Should that be realised, the Russians will have secured one of their major war aims which, if he is so minded, could pave the way for Putin to declare victory.

That the Ukrainians have not been able to block the Russian forces to date, and will struggle to prevent the rest of Donbass being captured, does not auger well for their chances of ever recovering the territory in any new offensive. As I have remarked many times on this blog, going on the attack is far harder than defence, and potentially more costly.

That has the Sunday Times ruminating on how far the West is prepared to go is supporting Ukraine, particularly when the nature of the endgame has yet to be properly defined, to the satisfaction of all parties.

At the moment, supporting nations are giving Zelensky his head, allowing him to call for the restoration of the pre-24 February borders as the first condition for talks with Russia, but it is unlikely that that consensus will survive if it becomes evident – which it surely must – that the Ukrainians have no realistic chance of securing that objective by force of arms.

It might be argued that, if the Russian forces can secure the territory in the first place, then the Ukrainians should be able to do likewise. This is especially the case as they claim to be more strongly motivated. Bolstered by the advanced weapons which are starting to come their way, they should be able to fight their way back to their pre-invasion borders.

On the other hand, while the Russians have been able to tolerate (so far) what are claimed to be massive losses, there is some doubt as to whether the Ukrainian forces could take the level of casualties they would necessarily incur in an aggressive campaign to recover lost territory.

Already, the New York Times is pointing to the level of hurt being sustained by ill-trained territorial defence forces drafted in to fill the gaps in the front lines as fighting intensified.

Then, while we have seen that the US is starting to organise the supply of weapons and materials for a prolonged war, the Sunday Times is waking up to the idea that the UK stocks are being hit by the donations to Ukraine.

Long after it has become evident to anyone with a brain, we are regaled by the musing of “defence experts” who are warning that the UK and its allies will soon be unable to meet Ukraine’s needs without hollowing out their own fighting capabilities.

This predicament, they argue, stems from decades of cost-cutting, historic strategic and procurement decisions, and disruption to the supply chains that feed the global arms industry.

Defence “sources”, we are told, have acknowledged that the current level of support cannot continue indefinitely. In private, ministers are said to have set “robust floors” below which they are not prepared to let critical and cutting-edge weapons and capabilities drop.

However, even with these “safeguards” in place, some experts believe the number of weapons already donated has left the British Army underpowered in a number of areas.

In this, though, there is a distinct whiff of naivety, when it would have to be said that the British Army was underpowered in a number of areas long before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, leading to its inability to provide some of the weapons most needed.

We do, however, get further insights on the level of preparedness, particularly in relation to the 227 Challenger tanks currently on inventory. These we get from Sir James Bucknall, a former lieutenant-general who commanded Nato’s Allied Rapid Reaction Corps from 2011-13.

He says he believes that fewer than half of that number were “operationally deployable with the correct armour and spares support”. He claims that: “These fleets are sitting in central warehouses, and they are not being maintained. Armoured vehicles need to be maintained and run every day”.

Bucknall complains that “the current whole fleet management system is akin to abandoning your car for a couple of years and expecting it to work perfectly when you climb back in it”. In the longer term, Bucknall argues, the Ukraine conflict has also called into question the decision, set out in the latest defence review, to cut the number of main battle tanks from 227 to 148.

Predictably, senior figures in the MoD reject this assessment, with one stating that as recently as May the UK had 125 main battle tanks stationed across Europe. “It shouldn’t be taken as read that if you want a more lethal army, you need more tanks”, this source says.

This opens up the argument on whether the tank has had its day, a controversy I must deal with on this blog in due course. Suffice to say for the moment that, although the Ukrainians have more anti-tank weapons than the Russians have tanks, they are still fielding tanks and asking for more.

Helpfully for the MoD, the controversy over tanks neatly diverts attention from the impoverished state of the artillery arm in the British Army, so successfully that the Sunday Times doesn’t notice that, unlike the American, French, Dutch, German, Italian and Polish governments, the British have failed to supply any modern heavy artillery and have had to resort of buying up war surplus guns from Belgium.

What is thus not being properly addressed, therefore, is the question of how Ukraine – with all its manpower limitations – is supposed to be in a position to mount a large-scale offensive to recover lost territory, if the West cannot even supply modern equipment in anything like the numbers needed to enable Ukrainian ground forces to prevail on the battlefield.

Even if the likes of the United States are eventually able to supply realistic levels of hardware, it is unlikely to be any time soon, which leaves it open for Russia to push for the completion of its own war aims and then to offer a cease fire.

Currently, we see Mykhailo Podoliak complaining that Russia is launching missiles on peaceful cities in an attempt to sow fear among the Ukrainian people and compel the Ukrainian government to negotiate or make territorial concessions.

If the Russians were to cease overt hostile actions and were to revert to passive defence of occupied territories, one wonders how many of Ukraine’s current supporters would be willing to finance its offensive actions, especially if the fighting ran into winter and the energy crisis intensified.

Something of this scenario has been posited by the Sunday Times which notes that the White House doubts that the Ukrainians will be able to retake all the Donbass. It is thus said to be debating what it feels would be a credible victory.

And while, ostensibly, Zelensky has the last word, we expect him to heed our concerns and opinion. Putin, the paper avers, would have very little reason to make a formal peace deal with Ukraine without the prospect of some level of sanctions relief. That is not something Zelensky can negotiate.

Like it or not, therefore, unless we believe this war can be resolved purely on the battlefield, which is highly unlikely, then the point made by Parris yesterday will take effect. The western allies are going to be looking for some sort of negotiated deal.

In the final analysis, if the West is unable to give Zelensky the tools to finish the job, in a timely fashion, there isn’t really any other option apart from a never-ending war which simply replicates the 2014 conflict but on a larger scale. Peace in our time, may yet again become the currency of the discourse, the sentiment not having improved for being aired once more.