Ukraine: que sera, sera

By Richard North - October 10, 2022

Maybe I spoke too soon in thinking that the Russians – and especially Putin – were going to play the Kerch attack low key.

So far, the only response recorded from the Russian president has been to order the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Emergency Situations and other departments to organise a government commission in connection with “the emergency”.

But today, Putin is to chair an operational meeting of his Security Council, which may or may not be significant. CNN tells us that the meeting itself isn’t out of the ordinary. Putin regularly chairs such meetings, usually on a weekly basis but, while the agenda is not publicly declared, there is no shortage of speculation as to the subjects that will be discussed.

As it happens, little speculation is needed as multiple newspapers are citing Putin’s video comments where, in a 33-second broadcast clip, he described the explosion on the Crimea Bridge as “a terrorist act aimed at destroying the critical infrastructure of the Russian Federation” organised by the Ukrainian special services.

Putin was talking about the explosion to Alexander Bastrykin, chairman of the Russian investigative committee, and this definitely seems to up the ante. Putin is perilously close to boxing himself into a corner where he has to order an extreme retaliation to the perceived “insult” which he now attributes to the Ukrainians.

Characterising this as a “terrorist act” aimed at the “critical infrastructure of the Russian Federation” almost defines the essential nature of the retaliation. Putin must be looking for a “spectacular” against Ukrainian “critical infrastructure”.

This, of course, is the man who has not ruled out the use of nuclear weapons, and if he is about to invest his increasingly tattered reputation in evening the score, we are possibly looking at a major escalation in the war, from which there will be no turning back.

We might get some clue as to what Putin has in store if he makes a further statement today, although the president may prefer action before words, especially if his advisors counsel on the need for tactical surprise. It is not entirely beyond the realms of possibility, therefore, that the next thing we see is a radioactive mushroom cloud.

In terms of potential targets for Putin’s ire, my best guess is still the Bilche-Volytsko-Uherske underground gas storage facility. With a capacity of over 17 billion cubic meters, the complex sitting astride a confluence of three major pipelines which feed gas into the West, a strike here has the potential not only to cause severe damage to the Ukrainian economy, but also to cause widespread disruption to Western economies.

We do not know for certain though that Putin has direct retaliation in mind and, so far, the Russian response seems to have been directed at downplaying the impact of the strike on the bridge.

According to multiple reports, road traffic has been opened up on the two remaining lanes of the road bridge. Passenger trains have been cleared to use the single track left undamaged, and work is proceeding apace to clear the wreckage of the burnt-out oil tanks from the other track.

Russian deputy prime minister, Marat Khusnullin, has promised that repair works on the bridge would be carried out “around the clock”, starting with detailed structural surveys of the bridge structure, with divers scheduled to check the supports.

The first passenger services resumed travel across the bridge on Saturday, traveling from the Crimean Peninsula to Krasnodar Krai in southern Russia, Russia’s Ministry of Transport said in a statement. Ferries have been organised to transfer heavy trucks, vans and buses, although some reports suggest that limited heavy traffic might soon be allowed back on the bridge.

If there is any such thing as the concept of a proportional response in the Russian lexicon, the efforts to minimise the bridge damage would point to a relatively limited and measured retaliatory response – if there is to be one. However, with Putin’s reputation so heavily invested in the fate of the bridge, we cannot necessarily expect logic to be applied.

It is worth noting, though, that Alexander Bastrykin, Putin’s correspondent on his video clip, in addition to fingering “foreign countries” as responsible for the attack, also made a point of blaming “Russian citizens” who, he claims, were also involved. “They helped in the preparation of the terrorist attack”, he says.

We saw yesterday how the Russian authorities had rapidly tracked down details relating to the truck which they claim had delivered the bomb to the bridge, and there have been further developments since.

The cargo, which could have been used to blow up the Crimean bridge, it is claimed, arrived in Russia from Georgia on 4 October, passing through the Russian border at about 6 am that day.

It appears that neither at customs nor other inspection services was anything suspicious found. When the cargo was redirected to Armavir, it was picked up on 7 October by 51-year-old driver Makhir Yusubov, who took it across the bridge on its way to Simferopol.

Now, it is reported that the FSB is investigating why the responsible services did not find the explosives and there are also checks being made to ascertain whether corruption might have been involved.

In addition to the Georgia link, it has been suggested that the cargo might also have passed through Bulgaria and Armenia, widening the net to encompass a widespread anti-Russian conspiracy, albeit initiated by the special services of Ukraine.

This possibly paves the way for a purge on domestic terrorism which, over the short term, could define the Russian response to the attack, on the basis that the authorities are seeking more “evidence” before they respond directly against Ukraine. This might be a forlorn hope, but given the convoluted politics of the region, nothing can be entirely ruled out.

Meanwhile, German chancellor Scholz has been talking to Biden, during which conversation Moscow’s latest nuclear threats were dismissed as “irresponsible”, with the two leaders stressing that any move to use nuclear weapons could have “extraordinarily grave repercussions” for Russia.

Whether this might have any deterrent effect on Putin is impossible to say – it could even provoke him into taking the very action that the leaders are seeking to avoid. But it should give the Russian president pause for thought.

Not to be outdone, Zelensky’s office has reacted to Putin’s accusation of being involved in a “terrorist attack”. According to Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to the head of the Ukrainian president’s office, this “sounds too cynical even for Russia”.

Podolyak referred to Russian aircraft which, within 24 hours, had hit the residential area of Zaporizhzhia with 12 missiles, killing 13 people and injuring more than 50. “There is only one terrorist state here and the whole world knows who it is”, he declared.

Whatever their merits, such statements are not calculated to calm what is a tense and potentially highly dangerous situation, and there seems to be little in the way of any diplomatic attempts to lower the temperature.

It almost seems as if western leaders are resigned to Putin taking whatever action he deems fit and dealing with the consequences afterwards – prompting The Times to call for the West to make it clear to Putin that he is not safe from retaliation.

It is, of course, a complete coincidence that the US Department of Health & Human Services is purchasing $290 million-worth of Amgen’s Nplate drug (romiplostim) for acute radiation sickness to be used in a radiological or nuclear emergency.

This, we are assured, has absolutely nothing to do with the situation in Ukraine.