Defence: a dilemma for Starmer

By Richard North - March 22, 2026

The news that Iran has fired off a two-stage ballistic missile with a nominal range of 4,000 km, thus demonstrating a weapon that can reach London, almost has the feel of Sadam Hussein and the “dirty dossier” scaremongering.

Nevertheless, I would have sent the GPS coordinates of No 10 to the regime, except I seem to have mislaid the address, and I gather the post out to Iran is none too reliable these days. In any case they probably have them – they can be found on Google maps easily enough.

The odd, perhaps alarming thing is that if a ballistic missile did land on No 10 and wiped out Starmer and his dreadful crew, I have to admit – as I did to a friend recently – that I would actually rejoice. I can say with absolute certainty that I have never despised a prime minister to such an extent before and would be heartily glad to see him gone.

That said, if Iran does genuinely have the technology to lob missiles over the distance – as Israel claims to be the case – then this is a serious development, if the recent experience of the strikes on southern Israel is anything to go by.

There, medium range Iranian ballistic missiles wounded about 100 people after striking the cities of Arad and Dimona, notably after air defence systems failed to intercept at least two of them.

That the much-fabled anti-missile defences seem to have failed in this instance, is very much a concern for the Israelis, especially as Dimona is home to their nuclear research programme – and possibly the nuclear weapons that they’ve never admitted having.

But such a failure would be irrelevant to the UK as we do not have a land-based anti-missile capability in the UK. There is a possibility that we could park a Type 45 air-defence destroyer in the Thames, as was considered for the 2012 Olympics and actually carried out for the coronation of Charles in May 2023, when HMS Diamond was used as a guardship.

Apparently, HMS Dauntless and Duncan are available at short notice, but this might not afford much protection. The Type 45’s primary weapon is the Aster 30 missile with a range of about 120 km, reaching a maximum altitude of around 20 km.

It has demonstrated limited ballistic missile defence in real-world scenarios, illustrated by HMS Diamond’s successful interception in the Red Sea in 2024 of a short-range Houthi ballistic missile (most likely an Iranian Fatah type).

This demonstrated that the system could engage very short-range or low-altitude ballistic threats in the terminal phase, but to engage a long-range missile in its terminal phase is much more challenging.

The type of missiles likely to be deployed by the Iranians follow high-arcing trajectories, reaching apogees of 500–1,000+ km altitude during mid-course phase, with re-entry speeds often hypersonic (Mach 5+). Thus, terminal-phase interception would require engaging the warhead at very high speed and altitude, which is far beyond Aster 30’s operational envelope.

This is not a weakness of the system. The ships were designed to provide localised air defence during fleet manoeuvres – not as a strategic shield for the UK homeland against missiles launched from a distance.

As it stands, though, the UK has no organic (i.e., independently operated, sovereign, and dedicated) anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defence system of any nature, capable of reliably defending the UK homeland against Iranian ballistic missiles.

For any protection – should it be considered necessary – the UK would be entirely reliant on Nato resources and, in particular, forward-deployed US assets. The main (and most reliable) of these would be the fleet of Aegis-equipped Arleigh Burke-class destroyers (one pictured) – the US equivalent to the Type 45.

The latest, upgraded versions fitted with improved radars and system management software, equipped with SM-3 Block IIA missiles, augmented with the SM-6 (RIM-174 Standard Missile-6), would provide a proven and highly effective defence.

The SM-6 missile, co-developed with Japan (to complement its own Aegis destroyers) , is a highly-advanced missile, known technically as a “mid-course interceptor” optimised for taking out intermediate-range ballistic missiles (those with a range of 3,000–5,500 km), exactly the type which would be used by Iran against the UK.

With a range of 1,200–2,500 km (or more in some estimates, depending on target), and speed of up to Mach 13+, they can reach into the exo-atmosphere climbing to a 900–1,050 km ceiling.

The type has been operational since 2019 and is combat-proven against Iranian missiles, Production has been ramped up significantly and there are adequate stocks, although they are expensive, at $28–40 million per unit.

Although they are primarily sea-based, they can also be configured for onshore use and land-based Aegis systems have been positioned in Poland and Romania as part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach programme.

Used in conjunction with the SM-3 is the SM-6 which is a terminal phase missile, which provides a longstop capability for missiles which get through the SM-3 screen. They are fully operational and have been extensively used in real-world scenarios, creating a versatile, layered defence when paired with SM-3s.

When considering our own seaborne air defence capabilities, the UK did have the option of buying in the US Aegis system, which was actually the path chosen by the Australian Navy for their three Hobart-class air warfare systems.

The UK, however, decided to go it alone with the hull, propulsion and radar systems which generated the Type 45 destroyers, equipping it with Franco-Italian Aster missile, which became the Sea Viper in Royal Navy use.

The adoption, in the mid-late 90s, came at a time when the UK was particularly enthusiastic about European defence co-operation, the missile then being developed by the Eurosam joint-venture company, owned equally (approximately 33.3 percent each) by MBDA France, MBDA Italy and the Thales Group.

That has left the UK with a very basic and limited ballistic missile defence (BMD) capability, with no prospect of enhancement, now or in the foreseeable future. And while the Australian Hobart class destroyers are not currently BMD-capable, they are capable of being upgraded and an enhancement programme is underway, with provision for integrating the SM-3 and SM-6 systems.

The downside of the Australian option was that it was more expensive, ending up at about £1.6 billion per ship, as opposed to the Type 45s which have cost about £1.2 billion (with propulsion improvements), while the enhancement programme is set to cost the Australians about £900 million per ship.

This compares with the current US budgeted cost for the very latest Flight III ships at around £2 billion each, but with the systems either in US or Australian hands, they have potent anti-missile capabilities, whereas the UK is completely defenceless.

That leaves Starmer in an interesting, if embarrassing situation. He can either ignore the Iranian threat (with a huge political penalty if it materialises), or he can go cap-in hand to Trump and ask him for assistance. And given Starmer’s grudging support for the US venture so far, he might get a dusty response unless he does some heavy-duty grovelling and pays the price of whatever Trump chooses to extract.

In the short-term, one or two Aegis destroyers based in the Channel (to take advantage of the mid-course interception capability) or even further out in the Atlantic or Mediterranean, might provide sufficient protection.

For the longer term, the UK might be able to convince Trump to release one or two Aegis Ashore installations, equipped with SM-3 Block IIA missiles. These might be obtained for the bargain price of about £200 million each, plus local construction and infrastructure costs which could more than double the price.

That might be an under-estimate though, given the estimated costs of the Romanian installation at £600 million. For two sites, allowing for integration with the phased array early warning radar at RAF Fylingdales, potentially we’re looking at £900 million–£1.1 billion (factoring modest radar savings).

Whichever way this is taken, Iran has just upped the ante in Trump’s war, creating a dilemma for Starmer that he can hardly have anticipated. In exposing poor choices which have created a serious gap in Britain’s defences, which would be unwise to ignore, it increases the pressure on the defence budget, at a time when finances are exceptionally tight, and weakens Britain’s bargaining position with the US.

Altogether, though, this couldn’t happen at a better time to damage an already highly unpopular prime minister. It would be the ultimate irony, therefore, if a war that started off with the intention of achieving regime change in Iran ended up with regime change in the UK.