Defence: grasping the nettle
By Richard North - March 28, 2026
On the subject of the UK’s intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) defences, I thought it would be wrong to leave the issue on a negative note, having established that both Starmer and Healey are lying about our capabilities.
In what I hope will be the last on this issue for a while, therefore, I’ve put together a piece which sets out our options for a national IRBM defence system, in the event that this is deemed a viable and necessary proposition, on economic and practical grounds.
Before we go there, it is as well to recap by repeating that the Type 45 Aster (Sea Viper) system, as presently configured, has no realistic capability of intercepting intermediate range (i.e., high-speed) ballistic missiles, so that it is the case that the UK has no organic, sovereign capability to deal with this threat.
We do gain partial protection from the US-operated European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), with the two land-based Aegis Ashore sites in Deveselu, Romania and Redzikowo, Poland, backed up by a fleet of five Aegis-equipped Arleigh Burke destroyers (with one added in Autumn 2024).
Although the ships are based at the naval station in Rota, Spain, three are currently deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean, which is just where they need to be in order to intercept missiles from Iran. All five are equipped with Aegis Baseline 9 and SM-3 Block IIA missiles, the combination being regarded as the “gold standard” for ballistic missile defence.
With the US Army operated AN/TPY-2 X-band, high-resolution, phased-array radar, based in about 59 Km west of the Turkish city of Malatya, roughly 700 Km from the Iranian border, controlled by the NATO Integrated Air Defence System via the Allied Air Command at Ramstein Air Base in Germany, this is about as good as it gets, with one notable exception.
Although the kill probabilities are high, no system is considered complete without a point defence for sensitive or high-value targets, as a backstop, or in the case of defence saturation where Iran launches a cluster of missiles which temporarily overwhelm the defence.
To that extent, the UK system is deficient and, unless that gap is filled, it will remain lacking until the introduction of the Sea Viper Evolution upgrade, which will not reach full operating capability until at least 2032. This, one presumes, will be carried over into the newly commissioned Type 83 fleet.
In theory, the upgraded system could deliver an anti-IRBM capability, although that is aspirational and, as yet (obviously) unproven. But, it must be stressed, even if it does work, this is a short-range system with a maximum range of 150 Km (about 93 miles).
To avoid gaps and to infill potential radar blind spots, one can calculate that, to provide complete UK coverage from ship-borne systems, between five and eight ships would be needed to be on station simultaneously. To take account of maintenance and rotation cycles, though, the Royal Navy would actually need a fleet of 15-24 destroyers to maintain 24/7 home defence coverage.
This, in itself, would be a waste of ships and manpower-intensive, and hideously expensive. A better option would be the provision of land-based batteries. If Aster commonality is required, the SAMP/T (Sol-Air Moyenne-Portée/Terrestre) system could be used – the land-based equivalent of Aster and an option adopted by France and Italy (pictured).
With the availability of Aster 30 Block 1NT missiles, Italy plans to bring its strength to 10 Batteries while France aims to reach 12 by 2035. With centrally located batteries, the UK could probably cover most of its land area with five batteries which, at a unit cost of £750 million, would cost the best part of £4 billion, with ongoing manpower and sustainment costs.
Alternately, the UK could go for the Aegis Ashore installations. Two such, with a mix of longer-range point-defence SM-6 and SM-3 Block IIA missiles, would set the defence budget back about £4.5 billion. Missile costs would be vastly increased, with SM-6 at £10-12.5 million each and the SM-3s at a staggering £40 million a pop, bringing the 20-year lifecycle cost for each installation potentially to over £3 billion.
This compares with a new-generation Aster 30 Block 1NT missile, where the estimates range from £2.1- 3.3 million, and an estimated 20-year lifecycle cost ranging between £1.13 and £1.5 billion – more expensive overall with five batteries as opposed to two Aegis installations.
Whether the SM-6 or the Aster missiles are used for point defence though, both have the same disadvantage in that interceptions take place within the atmosphere over the defended targets, which means that falling debris can cause damage and casualties.
An alternative is to use the Israeli-built Arrow 3 system which is designed for exo-atmospheric intercepts, up to a 100 Km ceiling, as incoming missiles enter the descent phase, prior to re-entry. That way, warheads are destroyed in space and the debris burns up on entry into the atmosphere or falls clear of the target area.
This is the option that has been chosen by Germany and, with a range of 2,400 Km (1,500 miles), one battery can cover the whole country at a cost of £3.3 billion, with the missile costs comparable with the Aster new generation.
One Arrow 3 installation would suffice for the UK and give coverage over Ireland and part of the continent, including France (unfortunately). The downside is that this is a dedicated BMD missile, while the Aster can also intercept ground-skimming cruise missiles and aircraft.
There is a further alternative to consider – the Patriot system. This though, is considered less cost-effective that Aster, with a battery cost of £830 million and the PAC-3 MSE missiles costing in the range of £3.4-5-8 million each.
If these are the options, the one thing that comes over is that ballistic missile defence does not come cheap. Thus, before any commitment is made, there needs to be a “conversation” about whether the threat is so real and so serious as to warrant the expense, or whether the risk is worth taking.
It is, however, worth noting that even if we are not facing a nuclear threat from rogue states such as Iran (yet), we cannot rule out the possibility that at some time in the future, the Mad Mullahs might lob a missile tipped with a “dirty bomb” incorporating highly radioactive isotopes.
Multiple studies have been carried out on the impact of an RDD (Radiological Dispersal Device), and estimates range from costs exceeding £20 billion for the immediate clean-up to hundreds of billions though business disruption, loss of property values and other consequential losses.
Essentially, the costs of defending ourselves is high but the penalty for not defending ourselves can be even higher. Which route to take is a question the nation must address.
Should we decide to invest in BMD, then – as this article sets out – there are numerous technical issues to consider, but one thing stands out which can be readily understood by the non-expert. The use of ships as a long term option for point-defence is neither economic nor practical – yet this is the default option that emerges from the SDR, in the absence of any specific commitment to BMD.
Clearly, if an effective defence is to be mounted, then this requires land-based installation. Choices must be made as to which system is most appropriate (SAMP/T), Aegis Ashore or Arrow 3.
One must also look to the future and emerging threats, such as the hypersonic glide missile. This weapon “skips” across the top of the atmosphere before plunging to earth, and therefore does not follow a predictable ballistic path.
The US is already working on a counter, known as the Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI), due to be operational by 2032, in an Aegis compatible system. The Israelis are working on Arrow 4 and the Europeans might have an interceptor called Aquila ready by 2035. Any system we choose must be future-proof.
But, whatever system we do chose (if that is the route we take), it must be remembered that the core of our defence is the US-supplied and funded EPAA programme, which is dependent on the continued US commitment to Nato.
There can be no question that this system is the “gold standard” and neither the UK nor Europe has the technical means to replace it. Thus, an important and continued part of our defence posture must be to keep the US within Nato. There is no realistic alternative.
What we cannot afford to do, though, is rest within the foggy domain of lies, where ministers pretend we are fully protected when we are not. This is a nettle we need to grasp.
