Defence: prevarication
By Richard North - March 26, 2026
So pleased with himself that he asked the prime minister a question about our defences from Iranian ballistic missiles that Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi MP posted a video clip of his performance on X, perhaps not fully appreciating that Starmer didn’t answer the question, other than to embed a direct lie in his response.
This, it seems to me, typifies the dilettante, performative approach of MPs these days – more interested in generating copy for their social media accounts than actually achieving anything of substance. And it is all the more serious a perversion in this case when Dhesi is chair of the defence committee – a particularly inappropriate appointment if ever there was one.
Continuing with my theme broached yesterday, the inadequacies of parliament to hold governments to account in many ways are symbolic of the failure of the whole institution. For, if there is no greater responsibility of the government than to protect its citizens, there can be no greater dereliction of the duty of parliament than to fail to hold it to account when its responsibility is not fulfilled.
It is all very well saying at this time that the risk of one or more Iranian missiles being directed at London is slight as it was (and remains) a credible threat and was officially recognised as such in 2009 with the launch of the European Phased Adaptive Approach programme.
It is through no action on the part of the prime minister and the defence establishment that the threat has not materialised. And, as the Iranian conflict runs into the fourth week, there are fears that unless Trump and Netanyahu decisively vanquish the regime and force its replacement, it will simply reconstitute itself and come back to extract fearful vengeance on its tormentors.
Even as it stands, there is news that Russia is supplying Iran with drones, apparently to a more sophisticated specification than the regime has yet been able to deploy, and there is no reason to discount the possibility that in the future a bad actor – whether Russia, China, North Korea or even Pakistan – might supply future Ayatollahs with intermediate range ballistic missiles.
Moreover, it would make sense for Iran to target London, which might be at the extremes of range of any missile supplied, simply because London is a big enough target for an inherently inaccurate missile to hit and, in the event that it fell short – which is not unlikely – there is still a chance that it might impact on an occupied area in continental Europe.
Thus, it is not good enough for the prime minister to walk away from this issue, leaving it hanging, and nor is it acceptable that the chair of the defence committee should rest on his laurels and be content with a non-answer as to the defences against a ballistic missile strike. The government must be pressed on its intentions, and there should be no let-up until satisfactory answers have been given.
The government could, of course, take the view that to seek protection from ballistic missiles launched by a rogue state is technically unrealistic or could only be achieved at disproportionate cost and, therefore, no action should be taken.
However, the inadequacies have not passed unnoticed and in a 2025 parliamentary briefing it was noted that air defence capabilities have been labelled “negligible” by defence contractor Northrop Grumman UK.
In his opening statement to a debate in the House of Commons in November 2024 on UK air and missile defences, Luke Akehurst MP called them a “critical weakness in the nation’s defences”.
Further, in October 2024, former defence select committee chairman, Tobias Ellwood, said that “for the moment, the UK’s air defence architecture is adequate to defend our skies” but warned that the changing nature of the threat from drones and hypersonic missiles required an “upgrade” to the UK’s defence posture.
From the current Strategic Defence Review, it would appear that the government accepts the argument for an upgrade, so it is not preparing to reject the idea of mounting a defence on practical or economic grounds.
In pursuit of improved missile defences, the SDR stresses that capable and effective defences for the UK can only be accomplished as part of a Nato endeavour, although it does mention the role of the Royal Navy’s Type 45 destroyers, even though the parliamentary briefing notes that it is considered to have limited ballistic missile defence utility within a homeland defence context.
Mentioned specifically in the SDR is the UK-led DIAMOND initiative (short for Delivering Integrated Air and Missile Operational Networked Defences), a UK-led programme designed to integrate Nato’s air and missile defence systems across Europe.
Announced in October 2024, it focuses on improving the “interoperability” of diverse national systems – ensuring that different sensors, radars, and interceptors from various allies can communicate and coordinate seamlessly in real-time.
Oddly enough, there is no mention in the SDR of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) programme – and only an indirect mention in the parliamentary briefing, even though this is the central pillar of Nato’s Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), despite this core role being re-affirmed at the 2024 Washington Nato Summit.
While Nato reports that a number of Allies have already offered their contributions or are undergoing development or acquisition of additional BMD assets, such as upgraded ships with BMD-capable radars, ground-based air and missile defence systems or advanced detection capabilities, it appears that the UK has no plans to furnish additional missile capabilities other than through the Sea Viper Evolution project.
As discussed in yesterday’s piece, that has very limited capabilities and does not match the Aegis/SM-3/6 capabilities. There is also some reliance on the Future Air Dominance System (FADS) programme, which will provide a next-generation maritime integrated air and missile defence and long-range precision strike capability to the Royal Navy, through the Type 83 project, although the capabilities have not been settled.
Reference is also made to the UK signing in 2022, a Letter of Intent to join the European Sky Shield initiative (ESSI), led by Germany. This initiative seeks to establish a multi-layered, ground-based integrated European air defence system, with an anti-ballistic missile capability, through the common acquisition of air defence equipment and missiles by participating European nations.
By the end of 2024 there were 23 participating nations in the project, albeit with some notable exceptions including France, Italy and Poland, the latter country being a key player in the EPAA programme, with its Aegis Ashore installation, based at the Naval Support Facility (NSF) Redzikowo, in northern Poland.
Together with the Deveselu installation in southern Romania (pictured), plus the four US Aegis destroyers attached to the programme, these form the core of the anti-ballistic missile capability, coordinated from the US base in Ramstein, Germany.
While ESSI is intended to complement the EPAA programme, filling in some of the gaps in capabilities, specifically in terms of countering drones and cruise missiles, it does not improve the ability to counter intermediate range ballistic missiles.
Therefore, lost in a fog of acronyms and diverse schemes, none of which are entirely transparent or at all well-known, and elided with defences against manned aircraft, drones and other threats, it is by no means clear what is intended, by whom, and when, or whether indeed there are any specific BMD improvements in the pipeline. This surely is a most unsatisfactory situation, one which the likes of the Defence Committee should be addressing but isn’t.
As for the media, the Sunday Times published a detailed investigation into the state of Britain’s missile defences back in January 2025, with the news that Nato would urge Starmer significantly to increase spending on air and missile defences.
Nothing seems to have come of that, and the SDR is far from representing a clarion call for more missile defences, leaving a huge gap in capabilities for any rogue state to exploit. Yet the ST article closed with the comment that, “As Britain’s adversaries grow bolder and more dangerous, the question is whether ministers can afford to prevaricate any longer”.
They could not then, and they should not do so 15 months later – but they will.
