Israel: mushroom clouds over Tehran

By Richard North - April 15, 2024

I am not the only one, by a long chalk, to wonder why it is that the US – with a gaggle of allies – is so keen to defend Israel from air attack while being relatively relaxed about the storm of missiles and drones daily launched against Ukraine.

This is by no means a specious distinction. In yesterday’s post and others, I have made it very clear that the current Russian assault on Ukraine represents an existential threat to that embattled nation, as it confronts the very real prospect of losing the war.

Despite this situation – with Zelensky crying out for more air defence systems – the US has remained unmoved and, apart from Germany pledging one extra Patriot battery, Ukraine has found itself on its own.

On the other hand, Israel was exposed to a threat which, while undoubtedly serious, was not by any means as critical as that facing Ukraine. Yet Biden’s government is falling over itself to provide material support, along with the UK and France, plus Jordan and (possibly) Saudi Arabia.

In assessing why there should be that degree of difference in the responses, there are many factors which could be taken into account. One of those is the identity of the protagonists in each case.

Ranged against Ukraine is the Russian Federation. Logically, the US want to avoid direct confrontation with this major power, not least because it is nuclear equipped. Responses could so very easily spiral out of control, precipitating a nuclear Armageddon.

Iran, though, is not known to be a nuclear power. There is some uncertainty as to whether it has actually produced or otherwise acquired nuclear weapons, but it is thought that it has stocks of enriched uranium which it could, if it was so minded, use to produce a number of nuclear bombs.

However, there is a degree of assurance that it does not have the means to mate a bomb with long-range delivery systems in a way that would permit it to attack Israel.

The same, of course, is not true of Israel. It has long been known, but never formally acknowledged, that the State of Israel is a nuclear power, with estimates of its stockpile ranging between 80 and 400 devices.

Furthermore, Israel has advanced delivery systems and has the capacity to reach targets in Iran. Approximately 80 nuclear warheads are said to be suitable for delivery by two dozen missiles, a couple of squadrons of aircraft, and perhaps a small number of sea-launched cruise missiles.

The existence of these weapons is, to an extent, the elephant in the room in the current crisis. Again, although never formally acknowledged, few analysts would disagree that, if ever Israel felt it was faced with an existential threat – particularly from Iran – it would deploy its nuclear arsenal.

This is an issue that was actually addressed by the Washington Post, back in February before the current crisis kicked off.

In an opinion piece entitled “Why the U.S. should start telling the whole truth about Israeli nukes”, three senior US analysts speculated over the possible use of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.

They referred to an unclassified Israel-Iran nuclear war game in which Israel fired nuclear weapons against Iran twice (using a total of 51 weapons) and Iran replied with a nuclear strike of its own. Surprisingly, this trio said, the strategic uncertainties following the exchange were greater than those that preceded it.

The questions which were gamed were: how much damage might Israeli nuclear strikes inflict against Iran’s nuclear and missile sites, infrastructure and population? Would Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities be incapacitated, or are they buried so deep they would survive?

Other question addressed were whether the region’s economies would be “knocked out” by such a nuclear exchange or just “jolted?” And then there was the key question as to whether Washington, Moscow or Beijing would be drawn into the conflict, and in what way.

Disturbingly, none of the participants in the war game was confident they could answer any of these questions. The WaPo analysts, therefore, argued that one of the best ways to clarify these matters was for American and Israeli experts and officials “to peek into the future by gaming different nuclear war scenarios”.

Bizarrely, US policy prohibits US employees from openly admitting Israel has nuclear arms, a situation arising from the late 1960s and 1970s when the United States or Israel were cautious about goading the Soviets into sharing nuclear weapons or technology with Egypt or Syria to “balance” whatever nuclear weapons Israel had.

The strategic uncertainties arising are unlikely to have been resolved, in which event, it seems logical to assume that the advice given to the US president would be to authorise any and all actions to ensure that Israel will not feel the need to use its nuclear weapons.

One can only speculate on this, but it would certainly explain why the US and allies have gone to such extraordinary lengths to protect Israel and why Biden is urging Netanyahu to “show restraint”.

It also might explain why the Islamic State was so quick yesterday to issue its statement after its strikes, declaring that: “The matter can be deemed concluded”.

On the face of it, Tehran must be as keen as the US to limit the scale of any retaliation, and it is fully aware of Israel’s nuclear capabilities, having buried many of its own nuclear installations and missile armoury in deep, bomb-proof bunkers.

Here, on the part of Iran, there must be an element of calculated gamble, in the knowledge that much of its own offensive capability might survive a nuclear attack, triggering an even more deadly attack on Israel than Saturday’s assault – one which the combined forces of Israel and the US might find it more difficult to repel.

Thus, Biden and his advisors must be hoping that the largely defensive actions so far achieved will be sufficient to restrain Netanyahu from initiating a nuclear response, even to the extent that further US assistance will be contingent on him exercising restraint.

By a perverse twist of logic, though, it might be argued that the situation has strengthened Netanyahu’s hand over Gaza. Should he argue with the Americans that the Iran attack constitutes an existential threat, thus justifying the use of nuclear weapons, the price of his “restraint” might be support for the Rafah incursion that has already been planned.

It is a matter of some interest, though, that in the many analytical pieces in the media, references to nuclear retaliation are hard to find. Even the Jerusalem Post, which explores in detail the shape of an Israeli retaliation, only considers conventional munitions.

Nevertheless, the Guardian’s Simon Tisdale – who also avoids reference to a nuclear response – thinks that Tehran has miscalculated and walked straight into a trap set by Netanyahu.

Overnight, Tisdale says, “the criticism in Washington of the Gaza debacle has dried up”. In Britain, too, calls on the government to insist on an effective Gaza ceasefire and limit support for Israel’s coalition will now probably be drowned out. Instead, the UK is already involved militarily, in the air over Syria and Iraq, and could be drawn further in.

In fact, it is the nuclear elephant in the room that probably gives Netanyahu his most powerful leverage – not against Tehran but over Washington. By making his restraint conditional on continued support, as long as he doesn’t overplay his hand, he now has regained his freedom of action in Gaza.

Interestingly, the UN Security Council will hold an emergency session today. They, would that they know it, are equally over a barrel. In order to limit the free rein that Netanyahu has fortuitously recovered, it must bring Iran to heel, to prevent the Israeli leader extracting more capital from its aggression.

And yet, for all that, thing could still go horribly wrong, signalled by mushroom clouds over Tehran. Despite that risk, if only Ukraine had kept its nuclear weapons, Zelensky might be thinking, he too would have enjoyed the sort of support that Israel is getting.