Pakistan: the electoral effect
By Richard North - May 10, 2023
As if we don’t already have enough problems in this benighted country of ours, it looks very much as if the arrest of Imran Khan in Pakistan yesterday is having a knock-on effect in the UK.
Within hours of the news of the arrest, angry groups were gathering outside Avenfield House in London, the luxury home of the three-time former Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif. Nawaz was removed from office by the Supreme Court of Pakistan after damning revelations over the Panama Papers.
Then in 2018, the Court disqualified him from holding public office and he was also sentenced to ten years in prison by an accountability court. In 2020, Nawaz arrived in London on bail, ostensibly for medical treatment, but has remained here since after having been formally declared a bail absconder following its expiry.
However, Nawaz’s younger brother, Shehbaz, just happens to be the current prime minister of Pakistan and by coincidence, was in London over the weekend to attend an event in Westminster.
There is no doubt, though, where the power really lies. According to information minister Marriyum Aurangzeb, Shehbaz has extended his stay in London by a day on the “instructions” of his older brother, in order “to hold consultations on important national and political issues”.
The Avenfield House residence, therefore, is a natural target for protest for Pakistani expatriates, but this has not stopped crowds gathering outside the Pakistani embassy in Knightsbridge as well.
Yet any gatherings here are relatively restrained compared with what is happening in Pakistan, where violent protests are reported to have broken out all over the country.
We are told that at least one person was killed when protesters clashed with soldiers in Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan province, and dozens across the country were injured. Khan’s party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), called for nationwide protests.
Supporters are said to have stormed a commander’s residence in Lahore and the Pakistan Army headquarters in Rawalpindi. “There are thousands and thousands of people”, says Munaza Hassan, a PTI official.
According to Munaza, the crowd had entered the house, despite a cordon being placed around it. “There has been lots of tear gas used by the police despite many women and children being here”, she added. “We’re not moving until Imran Khan is released”.
Yet, this violence has been a long time coming, with the country said to be on the verge of a civil war as the political crisis intensifies. At its heart is the struggle for power between the country’s civilian majority, the military establishment and what is branded its corrupt, puppet government.
The governing coalition, PDM (Pakistan Democratic Movement), led by prime minister Shehbaz, is described as “a motley crew of 13 political parties”. Fully 60 percent of the cabinet are out on bail for charges ranging from money laundering, murder, kidnapping, custodial torture and assassination attempts.
With a general election due later in the year, Imran Khan and his PTI are leading in all the polls and have won 30 of 37 recent local elections. He was ousted in April last year in a vote of no-confidence, when members of his party were bribed to switch sides and vote against him.
He was then targeted in an assassination attempt on 3 November 2022, in Punjab province. In broad daylight, multiple shooters fired at his vehicle wounding 14 people. One innocent bystander died. Khan, survived, taking three bullets to his right leg.
According to the source cited, the country is now facing a crisis along with a massive social upheaval. The public, we are told, is fed up with the corruption of the elites, the situation said to be unlike anything previously experienced.
In speeches and on social media, the Guardian says, Khan has blamed the military for orchestrating a “western-backed conspiracy” to topple him. He has made vitriolic speeches against the country’s most powerful military figures who were previously seen as untouchable.
After being shot last November, he has openly accused the government and military of colluding with foreign powers to have him assassinated. The government has responded by pursuing charges against him for corruption and sedition, which Khan alleges are politically motivated.
The former cricket star, though, is not without his critics, who accuse him of stirring up political turmoil for selfish ends. But, the Guardian notes, just as thousands took to the streets after he lost power, Khan’s enduring popularity has been evident after his arrest when his many diehard loyalists took to the streets in protest.
Amid widespread discontent with Shehbaz’s government, as inflation and food shortages have rocketed, Khan was expected to return to power in the general election, so this arrest is seen as an attempt to remove him from the slate.
The government’s response to the protests has been swift and extreme. The authorities have cut mobile internet services across the country, and access to Facebook, YouTube and Twitter has been restricted, where videos of the protests were being widely shared.
The fear is that, if the violence is not contained, there will be another military takeover and the restoration of martial law which has applied to Pakistan for much of its history. And, given the febrile mood of the country, the chances of this descending into civil war are high.
Although the UK reportage of the situation is not quite as scant as it has been with Sudan, it is still the case that foreign affairs in the national press are poorly reported, and coverage has been sporadic and infrequent. We are thus faced with the prospect of another bout of turmoil emerging, apparently with little warning, then to dominate the headlines for a while.
The problem for the UK government though – apart from having to deal with the regional instability in an area where we have strong economic interests and political ties – is that spill-over into British domestic politics is inevitable.
Not only is the resident Pakistani community in the UK heavily embedded in the British political process, it tends to prioritise South Asian issues, treating them as more important than UK national concerns.
Furthermore, as I have been observing over the years, there is a polarising effect between the two main parties, where Labour tends to support Muslim communities while the Tories are pitching for the Indian Hindu vote.
This notwithstanding, both sectors are capable of voting tactically and, therefore, the Indian-heritage Sunak will be under some pressure to formulate a policy line favoured by British Pakistanis.
Given that the Muslim vote could be pivotal in our general election, there is a distinct possibility that the government’s response to events in Pakistan will be decided with electoral considerations in mind.
Since there are also some very unpleasant things happening in India, while Modi seems to be adopting a strong mislamthropic line, South Asian politics could end up dominating the next general election campaign.
Therefore, political instability in Pakistan, which then erupts into violence, is not just another Sudan, which can grab the headlines briefly and then disappear. South Asian politics have become British politics, and we ignore them at our peril.