Defence: returning to the fray

By Richard North - January 14, 2022

It’s been a while since I’ve done any serious writing about defence, not least because the last few years have been largely devoted to the EU Referendum and its aftermath.

Like energy – which I had also been neglecting – defence is a specialist subject. It requires basic knowledge and then a lot of work to keep current. Normally, you can’t just dip in and out of the subject and hope to stay abreast of the issues.

However, as this blog is devoted to political comment, our observations on defence – as with other subjects – are largely devoted to the broader political issues, we can still make useful contributions. We only need to be aware of the technology, tactics, and operations, but do not need to delve too deeply into the detail.

Although there is clearly some overlap – and some cross-over knowledge is often required – this is because our stamping ground is the interface between the specialist subject and Westminster and international politics. Much scrutiny is required here for, ultimately, defence is a political matter, managed (and mismanaged) by politicians who are themselves non-specialists.

What brings me (tentatively) back into the fray is an article in The Times (no paywall), headed “Second sea lord’s parting shot to ‘risk-averse’ Royal Navy”, which has the departing incumbent launching a “stinging rebuke” at the Royal Navy on his final day in office, claiming the service had “lost its ambition”.

This is Vice Admiral Nicholas Hine (now retired), who broke with long-held tradition to fire a public broadside in which he said: “I have despaired at times that collectively we had become self-censoring, risk-averse and lacking in curiosity, confidence and critical thinking skills”.

“We have these qualities”, he said, “but have allowed a rose-tinted view of tradition and a spurious belief that you can avoid risk by sticking to a failing status quo to avoid driving transformation”.

He then added: “As I go, I say to those who would have preferred to have the brakes on, the pedants and the naysayers, remain critical (always), but please understand that the need for, and the value of change, is not a fantasy – if we don’t transform, we will fail and we will lose”.

This is powerful stuff from a man who had been expected to apply for the role of First Sea Lord when the present post-holder was selected to become Chief of Defence Staff this autumn. Instead, he took to Twitter in October to announce that he had decided to retire, and now, with nothing to lose, he has made his previously concealed views known.

Hine also made the pages of the Telegraph (paywall), under the headline: “Royal Navy has ‘lost its ambition’, says outgoing Sea Lord in parting shot”, and the Guardian, which has “Royal Navy will fail without reform, says outgoing deputy chief”.

This latter article makes reference to December’s Defence Committee report, which received some publicity at the time.

Amid the limited coverage was The Times, which had “Royal Navy’s ships lack weapons to mount attack, MPs say”, telling us that Royal Navy ships have to act like porcupines at sea because they have good defensive capabilities but lack the weaponry to “take the fight to the enemy”.

The specialist magazine Defense News put it succinctly: “Too few surface ships and submarines, limited offensive capabilities, a lack of clarity around F-35 fighter jet numbers, budget restrictions, and delayed procurement are among a list of shortcomings identified by the report, entitled ‘We’re going to need a bigger Navy'”.

And there, all of a sudden – with a striking sense of déjà vu – I find that they are rehearsing issues which I was discussing on my other blog, Defence of the Realm, as far back as 2005-6, and particularly with reference to the Type 45 destroyers.

At the time of the launch of the first ship of the class, HMS Daring, I was highly critical of the project, complaining about the inordinate cost and, believe it or not, the lack of offensive capability in a ship that was primarily designed for fleet air defence and had only a limited anti-submarine capability, geared to its own self-defence.

I compared it unfavourably with the US equivalent, the multi-purpose DG Arleigh Burke class, which, in addition to its perhaps not quite as effective anti-aircraft capability (but with nearly double the number of missiles) has a significant land attack capability – being able to launch Tomahawk cruise missiles – an anti-shipping capability and world-beating anti-submarine warfare equipment, including towed-array sonar.

Not only is this formidable, multi-purpose warship still in operation after the first of class launch in September 1989, its remarkable design has proved so durable and adaptable that a total of 76 ships have been planned, with the latest version comprising 42 ships, planned to enter service from 2023 onwards.

Crucially, when the Australians needed a shipborne anti-aircraft capability, they selected the Arleigh Burke design, to be built in their own yards, agreeing a price tag of £400 million less than the then £1 billion price tag for the Type 45 (although both costs have since inflated).

At the time, though – as we recorded, the UK was locked into European defence cooperation, the then Conservative government in 1992 having opted for a “European” solution, setting up the Horizon “Common New Generation Frigate” project with France and Italy.

When this failed, the specification for the Type 45 emerged, which included a carry-over from the Horizon project, the French-built Principal Air-to-Air Missiles (PAAMS) system. Because the Type 45 relied on this costly system, the UK was forced to adopt a unique design.

With the costs of the missile system, the problematic, novel propulsion system and other development costs, the ships have proved so pricey that we’ve only been able to afford six, instead of the original twelve planned. And, while the PAAMS launcher was intended, in the fullness of time, to be multi-functional, additional capability has not materialised, leaving the ships lacking the offensive power, the lack of which is provoking the select committee and Admiral Hine to complain.

One has to recall, though, that back in 2006 when HMS Daring was launched, The Times wibbled that the class, “will be the most powerful, advanced and deadly warships in the world”, something which was simply and demonstrably not true. Yet it was eclipsed by The Sun which laughably described Daring as “the deadliest ship ever built”.

If this once again demonstrates the media’s total inability to report coherently on defence matters, it also provides a graphic reminder that decisions made on defence – like those with energy – often come back to haunt us a decade or more after they have been made.

Totally missed by the select committee is the fact that many of the problems confronting the Royal Navy arise from decisions made in the 80s and 90s, by the Thatcher and Major governments, and then in the 90s and the early years of the 21st Century by successive Labour governments under Blair and Brown – many of them motivated by the desire for European defence co-operation, especially after Blair’s notorious St Malo defence agreement.

Now we hear from witnesses to the select committee that the government must decide “whether the Royal Navy institutionally is more keen on being able to work closely with the US Navy than it is on operational independence or working with other European navies”, with one witness arguing for the UK to prioritise its relationship with the US.

Before we left the EU, that battle had been lost, with barely concealed European cooperation driving naval procurement. In the post-Brexit world, with new threats emerging, we are having to think again. But it will be decades before we have a capacity which we should already have, assuming we have a government that is even capable of buying the right equipment.

Despite having been gone so long, it is rather disturbing to find that nothing really changes.